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04-20-2005, 03:31 PM
Source (http://apnews.excite.com/article/20050420/D89J3SKG0.html)
Saudis in Talks on Nuke Loophole Agreement
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Apr 20, 7:34 AM (ET)
By GEORGE JAHN
VIENNA, Austria (AP) - Saudi Arabia has quietly begun talks on a U.N.-sanctioned agreement that could curtail any outside probe of its atomic intentions - a move that heightens concerns in a region already edgy about rival Iran's nuclear program.
The Saudis deny any plans to develop nuclear weapons, and diplomats close to the International Atomic Energy Agency told The Associated Press that the U.N. nuclear monitor has no firm evidence that would cast doubt on the Saudi assertions. Phone calls to the Saudi representative to the IAEA or the government in Riyadh for comment were not returned.
But the diplomats say that past Saudi nuclear interest is heightening worries, as is the timing of the efforts to sign on to the IAEA's small quantities protocol that would exempt the country from most of the agency's control authority.
Born of more trusting days, the agreement has been joined by dozens of countries, most of which have never experimented with nuclear weapons. But the protocol is now viewed with suspicion within the agency, after revelations of other loopholes that have allowed prewar Iraq, Iran, Libya and other countries to work secretly on known or suspected nuclear weapons programs.
The protocol frees countries from reporting the possession of up to 10 tons of natural uranium - or up to 20 tons of depleted uranium, depending on the degree of enrichment - and 2.2 pounds of plutonium. It also allows them to keep silent about work on nuclear facilities secret until six months before they are ready for operation. And once a protocol is signed, the country's word is normally not questioned.
Experts say 10 tons of natural uranium can be processed into the material for up to two nuclear warheads. And Iran and South Korea both used substantially smaller amounts of uranium or plutonium in laboratory-scale experiments with suspected links to arms programs.
Saudi Arabia has never negotiated an agreement that would define IAEA controls, even though it is obligated to do so as a signer of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Such foot dragging, and now the move to sign on to a small quantities protocol, have contributed to concerns about the protocol within top IAEA echelons.
"As has become clear over the last several years, states can conduct nuclear activities of proliferation concern with quantities of nuclear material much smaller" than allowed under the protocol, Pierre Goldschmidt, a deputy IAEA director general, said in a report in February.
Goldschmidt's comments - and similar statements from IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei - reflect an agency drive to close loopholes to the inspections system.
The Saudi push comes amid increased nuclear-generated tensions in the region, fed by suspicions that Iran might want to develop the bomb. And it highlights important gaps in nuclear controls just before a high-level international nonproliferation conference is to convene next month in New York.
While the Saudi government insists it has no interest in going nuclear beyond a small research reactor built in the 1970s, in the past two decades it has been linked to prewar Iraq's nuclear program, to Pakistan and to the Pakistani nuclear black marketeer A.Q. Khan. It has expressed interest in Pakistani missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and credible reports say Saudi officials have discussed taking the nuclear option as a deterrent in the volatile Middle East.
"It certainly is a region of tension, and the (nuclear control) requirements should be tightened instead of eased," said David Albright, a former U.N. nuclear inspector who now runs the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington. "What if the security situation prompts the Saudis to rethink their (nuclear) options - or what if a (nuclear-minded) terrorist group sets up on Saudi territory?"
A Vienna-based diplomat familiar with the issue said that while there is no firm evidence that the Saudis "have been playing around, we can never be sure" should the IAEA's authority to inspect be curtailed and it be restricted to taking the word of the government that all is well.
He, like the other diplomats, spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic.
Worries about Saudi Arabia were nonexistent in the 1970s, when the first small quantities protocols were negotiated. The overriding fear back then was that the Cold War could turn nuclear.
While the Nonproliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970, was designed to contain the spread of nuclear weapons, the focus was on developed countries on both sides of the ideological U.S.-Soviet divide.
Small quantities protocols were thus welcomed as a way to allow investigators to focus on the visible nuclear threat. By the late 1990s, a decade after the end of the Cold War, more than 70 nations, many of them in the developing world, had signed on to the protocol.
Among them are countries like Trinidad and Tobago and Tonga, whose openness and geographic location make them of little concern. Others, like Yemen, are more worrisome as part of the volatile Middle East and as a potential base for terrorist groups.
But the Saudi case is even more disquieting considering the country's past record.
British newspapers and several think tanks have reported independently on the existence of a Saudi position paper as recently as two years ago that listed the possible acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability as a deterrent.
Further back, Saudi defector Muhammad Khilewi produced documents in 1994 purporting to show that the Saudi government had paid up to $5 billion to Saddam Hussein to build nuclear weapons on condition that should the project succeed, some of the bombs would be given to the Saudis.
The former diplomat's papers also appeared to show Saudi payments for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Later, in 1999, Prince Sultan Bin Abd al-Aziz, the Saudi defense minister, toured part of Pakistan's secret nuclear facilities.
While there, he reportedly met with A.Q. Khan - the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb who four years later would be identified as the head of the international nuclear black market that supplied the illicit programs of Iran, Libya and possibly North Korea.
Saudis in Talks on Nuke Loophole Agreement
Email this Story
Apr 20, 7:34 AM (ET)
By GEORGE JAHN
VIENNA, Austria (AP) - Saudi Arabia has quietly begun talks on a U.N.-sanctioned agreement that could curtail any outside probe of its atomic intentions - a move that heightens concerns in a region already edgy about rival Iran's nuclear program.
The Saudis deny any plans to develop nuclear weapons, and diplomats close to the International Atomic Energy Agency told The Associated Press that the U.N. nuclear monitor has no firm evidence that would cast doubt on the Saudi assertions. Phone calls to the Saudi representative to the IAEA or the government in Riyadh for comment were not returned.
But the diplomats say that past Saudi nuclear interest is heightening worries, as is the timing of the efforts to sign on to the IAEA's small quantities protocol that would exempt the country from most of the agency's control authority.
Born of more trusting days, the agreement has been joined by dozens of countries, most of which have never experimented with nuclear weapons. But the protocol is now viewed with suspicion within the agency, after revelations of other loopholes that have allowed prewar Iraq, Iran, Libya and other countries to work secretly on known or suspected nuclear weapons programs.
The protocol frees countries from reporting the possession of up to 10 tons of natural uranium - or up to 20 tons of depleted uranium, depending on the degree of enrichment - and 2.2 pounds of plutonium. It also allows them to keep silent about work on nuclear facilities secret until six months before they are ready for operation. And once a protocol is signed, the country's word is normally not questioned.
Experts say 10 tons of natural uranium can be processed into the material for up to two nuclear warheads. And Iran and South Korea both used substantially smaller amounts of uranium or plutonium in laboratory-scale experiments with suspected links to arms programs.
Saudi Arabia has never negotiated an agreement that would define IAEA controls, even though it is obligated to do so as a signer of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Such foot dragging, and now the move to sign on to a small quantities protocol, have contributed to concerns about the protocol within top IAEA echelons.
"As has become clear over the last several years, states can conduct nuclear activities of proliferation concern with quantities of nuclear material much smaller" than allowed under the protocol, Pierre Goldschmidt, a deputy IAEA director general, said in a report in February.
Goldschmidt's comments - and similar statements from IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei - reflect an agency drive to close loopholes to the inspections system.
The Saudi push comes amid increased nuclear-generated tensions in the region, fed by suspicions that Iran might want to develop the bomb. And it highlights important gaps in nuclear controls just before a high-level international nonproliferation conference is to convene next month in New York.
While the Saudi government insists it has no interest in going nuclear beyond a small research reactor built in the 1970s, in the past two decades it has been linked to prewar Iraq's nuclear program, to Pakistan and to the Pakistani nuclear black marketeer A.Q. Khan. It has expressed interest in Pakistani missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and credible reports say Saudi officials have discussed taking the nuclear option as a deterrent in the volatile Middle East.
"It certainly is a region of tension, and the (nuclear control) requirements should be tightened instead of eased," said David Albright, a former U.N. nuclear inspector who now runs the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington. "What if the security situation prompts the Saudis to rethink their (nuclear) options - or what if a (nuclear-minded) terrorist group sets up on Saudi territory?"
A Vienna-based diplomat familiar with the issue said that while there is no firm evidence that the Saudis "have been playing around, we can never be sure" should the IAEA's authority to inspect be curtailed and it be restricted to taking the word of the government that all is well.
He, like the other diplomats, spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic.
Worries about Saudi Arabia were nonexistent in the 1970s, when the first small quantities protocols were negotiated. The overriding fear back then was that the Cold War could turn nuclear.
While the Nonproliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970, was designed to contain the spread of nuclear weapons, the focus was on developed countries on both sides of the ideological U.S.-Soviet divide.
Small quantities protocols were thus welcomed as a way to allow investigators to focus on the visible nuclear threat. By the late 1990s, a decade after the end of the Cold War, more than 70 nations, many of them in the developing world, had signed on to the protocol.
Among them are countries like Trinidad and Tobago and Tonga, whose openness and geographic location make them of little concern. Others, like Yemen, are more worrisome as part of the volatile Middle East and as a potential base for terrorist groups.
But the Saudi case is even more disquieting considering the country's past record.
British newspapers and several think tanks have reported independently on the existence of a Saudi position paper as recently as two years ago that listed the possible acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability as a deterrent.
Further back, Saudi defector Muhammad Khilewi produced documents in 1994 purporting to show that the Saudi government had paid up to $5 billion to Saddam Hussein to build nuclear weapons on condition that should the project succeed, some of the bombs would be given to the Saudis.
The former diplomat's papers also appeared to show Saudi payments for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Later, in 1999, Prince Sultan Bin Abd al-Aziz, the Saudi defense minister, toured part of Pakistan's secret nuclear facilities.
While there, he reportedly met with A.Q. Khan - the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb who four years later would be identified as the head of the international nuclear black market that supplied the illicit programs of Iran, Libya and possibly North Korea.