Gold9472
02-15-2007, 09:53 AM
Not-So-Straight Shootin’
Bush seems to be intentionally sending mixed messages on Iran.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17156683/site/newsweek/
By Richard Wolffe and Holly Bailey
Updated: 6:18 p.m. ET Feb 14, 2007
Feb. 14, 2007 - President Bush stepped into the East Room on Wednesday with a clear message about the intel on Iran: the situation is murky.
For a self-styled straight-shootin’ Texan, this was more than a little confusing. Just a few days ago, senior military officials told reporters in Baghdad they were certain that a new type of deadly roadside bomb was reaching Iraqi fighters with the approval of top leaders in Tehran.
President Bush wasn’t so sure about the Tehran part. But he also wasn’t so sure that he cared. “What we do know is that the Quds force was instrumental in providing these deadly IEDs to networks inside of Iraq. We know that,” he explained. “And we also know that the Quds force is a part of the Iranian government. That's a known. What we don't know is whether or not the head leaders of Iran ordered the Quds force to do what they did.”
That explanation left a lot of reporters looking puzzled. So the president tried again.
“Either they knew or didn't know, and what matters is, is that they're there. What's worse, that the government knew or that the government didn't know?”
At this point he flashed a wide grin, as if he had just hit upon a great way to distill the problem. But what’s worse: that the president knows or that he doesn’t know whom the enemy is?
For weeks now, Iran has eclipsed Iraq as the subject of the biggest parlor game in Washington. Is the president heading to war or committed to peace? It turns out the answer is something in between. The practice of sending mixed messages—about whether the government of Iran is involved or not, whether the proper response should be military or not, whether the intel on the country is good or not—seems to be an intentional policy.
There are two goals, both intended to roll back Iran’s ambition in the region. Call it aggressive containment—or, as they prefer to call it inside the White House, “pushback.”
The first goal is to reduce and deter Iranian meddling—both political and military—in Iraq. The second is to assert American power in the region as a way of defending Sunni allies. “We’re not going to war,” says one senior Bush aide. “Some of this is common sense. If someone is doing something to kill your own troops, you have to push back on the ground. There have to be some consequences on the ground. The carrier ships are signals to the partners, the gulf states. We are in there for the long run.”
The key meeting with the Persian Gulf states was Cheney’s trip to Saudi Arabia in late November. At the time, the media assumed the journey was intended to win Saudi support for Bush’s new strategy in Iraq—or it was a chance for the Saudis to lobby Cheney to change policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
According to one senior Cheney aide, it was neither. The Saudis only wanted to talk about Iran—specifically, their security concerns about that country’s regional ambitions and its nuclear program. In a recent NEWSWEEK interview, Cheney said there was “widespread concern throughout the region about Iran” and said that there was “greater agreement … among the folks in the region than I can recall on most other propositions in recent years.” He also described the deployment of the carrier task force to the gulf as “a very strong signal to everybody in the region that the United States is here to stay, that we clearly have significant capabilities, and that we are working with friends and allies as well as the international organizations to deal with the Iranian threat.”
Still, Bush’s aides admit they may have gone too far with the saber-rattling, prompting an intense wave of speculation about war with Iran. They concede that Bush’s primetime speech on Iraq last month took an aggressive tone on Iran that may have been misunderstood. “Maybe the rhetoric wasn’t properly worded,” said one senior aide. “There was a tactical purpose and a strategic purpose to what was said. The tactical message was for Iranian operatives inside the territory of Iraq. The other audience we were speaking to isn’t the Iranians but the gulf states and the Saudis, to say we take this threat seriously.”
In short, the White House wants Iran to be unsettled, and unsure of what Washington has in mind. But Bush doesn’t want to scare his allies in the region—let alone the Congress and the country—into thinking he’s serious about starting another war.
Bush has made only one firm decision about Iran, soon after his re-election in late 2004: to entrust the diplomacy to three European allies. That was a decision about process, not policy. For those involved in the run-up to Iraq, the approach to Iran is an extraordinary reversal. “It’s an irony that hits us every day,” says one senior European official. “All they want to talk about is U.N. resolutions and the multilateral talks. If only they had done the same with Iraq.”
So far the White House believes the tough talk on Iran is working. President Bush told C-Span this week that the whole idea was to pressure the Iranian regime into more reasonable behavior. “The Iranian people are good, decent, honorable people,” he said. “And they've got a government that is belligerent, loud, noisy, threatening—a government which is in defiance of the rest of the world, and it says that we want a nuclear weapon. And so our objective is to continue to keep the pressure, in hopes that rational folks will show up and say, it's not worth it—it's not worth the isolation.”
But there’s a fine line between keeping the pressure on Tehran and what sounds like fightin’ words. The challenge for the administration is to calm the fears of war while still making Iran fearful of American military power. No wonder rational folks are confused.
Bush seems to be intentionally sending mixed messages on Iran.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17156683/site/newsweek/
By Richard Wolffe and Holly Bailey
Updated: 6:18 p.m. ET Feb 14, 2007
Feb. 14, 2007 - President Bush stepped into the East Room on Wednesday with a clear message about the intel on Iran: the situation is murky.
For a self-styled straight-shootin’ Texan, this was more than a little confusing. Just a few days ago, senior military officials told reporters in Baghdad they were certain that a new type of deadly roadside bomb was reaching Iraqi fighters with the approval of top leaders in Tehran.
President Bush wasn’t so sure about the Tehran part. But he also wasn’t so sure that he cared. “What we do know is that the Quds force was instrumental in providing these deadly IEDs to networks inside of Iraq. We know that,” he explained. “And we also know that the Quds force is a part of the Iranian government. That's a known. What we don't know is whether or not the head leaders of Iran ordered the Quds force to do what they did.”
That explanation left a lot of reporters looking puzzled. So the president tried again.
“Either they knew or didn't know, and what matters is, is that they're there. What's worse, that the government knew or that the government didn't know?”
At this point he flashed a wide grin, as if he had just hit upon a great way to distill the problem. But what’s worse: that the president knows or that he doesn’t know whom the enemy is?
For weeks now, Iran has eclipsed Iraq as the subject of the biggest parlor game in Washington. Is the president heading to war or committed to peace? It turns out the answer is something in between. The practice of sending mixed messages—about whether the government of Iran is involved or not, whether the proper response should be military or not, whether the intel on the country is good or not—seems to be an intentional policy.
There are two goals, both intended to roll back Iran’s ambition in the region. Call it aggressive containment—or, as they prefer to call it inside the White House, “pushback.”
The first goal is to reduce and deter Iranian meddling—both political and military—in Iraq. The second is to assert American power in the region as a way of defending Sunni allies. “We’re not going to war,” says one senior Bush aide. “Some of this is common sense. If someone is doing something to kill your own troops, you have to push back on the ground. There have to be some consequences on the ground. The carrier ships are signals to the partners, the gulf states. We are in there for the long run.”
The key meeting with the Persian Gulf states was Cheney’s trip to Saudi Arabia in late November. At the time, the media assumed the journey was intended to win Saudi support for Bush’s new strategy in Iraq—or it was a chance for the Saudis to lobby Cheney to change policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
According to one senior Cheney aide, it was neither. The Saudis only wanted to talk about Iran—specifically, their security concerns about that country’s regional ambitions and its nuclear program. In a recent NEWSWEEK interview, Cheney said there was “widespread concern throughout the region about Iran” and said that there was “greater agreement … among the folks in the region than I can recall on most other propositions in recent years.” He also described the deployment of the carrier task force to the gulf as “a very strong signal to everybody in the region that the United States is here to stay, that we clearly have significant capabilities, and that we are working with friends and allies as well as the international organizations to deal with the Iranian threat.”
Still, Bush’s aides admit they may have gone too far with the saber-rattling, prompting an intense wave of speculation about war with Iran. They concede that Bush’s primetime speech on Iraq last month took an aggressive tone on Iran that may have been misunderstood. “Maybe the rhetoric wasn’t properly worded,” said one senior aide. “There was a tactical purpose and a strategic purpose to what was said. The tactical message was for Iranian operatives inside the territory of Iraq. The other audience we were speaking to isn’t the Iranians but the gulf states and the Saudis, to say we take this threat seriously.”
In short, the White House wants Iran to be unsettled, and unsure of what Washington has in mind. But Bush doesn’t want to scare his allies in the region—let alone the Congress and the country—into thinking he’s serious about starting another war.
Bush has made only one firm decision about Iran, soon after his re-election in late 2004: to entrust the diplomacy to three European allies. That was a decision about process, not policy. For those involved in the run-up to Iraq, the approach to Iran is an extraordinary reversal. “It’s an irony that hits us every day,” says one senior European official. “All they want to talk about is U.N. resolutions and the multilateral talks. If only they had done the same with Iraq.”
So far the White House believes the tough talk on Iran is working. President Bush told C-Span this week that the whole idea was to pressure the Iranian regime into more reasonable behavior. “The Iranian people are good, decent, honorable people,” he said. “And they've got a government that is belligerent, loud, noisy, threatening—a government which is in defiance of the rest of the world, and it says that we want a nuclear weapon. And so our objective is to continue to keep the pressure, in hopes that rational folks will show up and say, it's not worth it—it's not worth the isolation.”
But there’s a fine line between keeping the pressure on Tehran and what sounds like fightin’ words. The challenge for the administration is to calm the fears of war while still making Iran fearful of American military power. No wonder rational folks are confused.