Partridge
04-13-2006, 12:17 PM
Truth about Iraq's mobile weapons factories ignored, experts say
Sydney Morning Herald (http://smh.com.au/news/world/truth-about-iraqs-mobile-weapons-factories-ignored-experts-say/2006/04/12/1144521401075.html)
ON MAY 29, 2003, 50 days after the fall of Baghdad, President George Bush proclaimed a new victory for his Administration in Iraq: two small trailers captured by US troops had turned out to be long-sought mobile "biological laboratories".
"We have found the weapons of mass destruction," he trumpeted.
The claim, repeated by top Administration officials for months, was hailed at the time as a vindication of the decision to go to war. But even as Mr Bush spoke, US intelligence officials had evidence that it was not true.
A mission to Iraq - not made public until now - had already concluded that the trailers had nothing to do with biological weapons. Leaders of the Pentagon-sponsored mission transmitted their unanimous findings to Washington in a field report on May 27, 2003, two days before Mr Bush's statement.
The interim report and a 122-page final report three weeks later were stamped "secret" and shelved. Meanwhile, for nearly a year, the White House and intelligence officials continued to claim that the trailers were weapons factories.
The authors of the reports were nine US and British civilian experts - scientists and engineers with extensive experience in making bioweapons - who were dispatched to Baghdad by the Defence Intelligence Agency for an analysis of the trailers. Six of the experts - who did not want to be named - described their findings to a reporter from The Washington Post . Their accounts were verified by current and former government officials close to the mission.
The contents of the final report remain classified. But interviews reveal that the technical team was unequivocal in its conclusion that the trailers were not intended to manufacture biological weapons. "There was no connection to anything biological," said one expert who studied the trailers. Another said they were referred to as "the biggest sand toilets in the world"
The technical team's findings had no apparent impact on the intelligence agencies' public statements on the trailers. On May 28, 2003, a day after the team's report was sent to Washington, the CIA released its first formal assessment of the trailers, reflecting the views of its Washington analysts.
Throughout the rest of 2003 the trailers were referred to as "mobile biological laboratories" in Administration speeches and press statements. In June, the then secretary of state Colin Powell said the "confidence level is increasing" that the trailers were intended for biowarfare.
In September, Vice-President Dick Cheney said the trailers could have been used to produce anthrax or smallpox.
The technical team's preliminary report was transmitted on May 27, just before its members returned home. The final report remained unequivocal in declaring the trailers unsuitable for weapons production.
The team members returned to their jobs and watched as their work simply vanished. "I went home and fully expected that our findings would be publicly stated," one member said.
"It never happened. I just had to live with it."
Sydney Morning Herald (http://smh.com.au/news/world/truth-about-iraqs-mobile-weapons-factories-ignored-experts-say/2006/04/12/1144521401075.html)
ON MAY 29, 2003, 50 days after the fall of Baghdad, President George Bush proclaimed a new victory for his Administration in Iraq: two small trailers captured by US troops had turned out to be long-sought mobile "biological laboratories".
"We have found the weapons of mass destruction," he trumpeted.
The claim, repeated by top Administration officials for months, was hailed at the time as a vindication of the decision to go to war. But even as Mr Bush spoke, US intelligence officials had evidence that it was not true.
A mission to Iraq - not made public until now - had already concluded that the trailers had nothing to do with biological weapons. Leaders of the Pentagon-sponsored mission transmitted their unanimous findings to Washington in a field report on May 27, 2003, two days before Mr Bush's statement.
The interim report and a 122-page final report three weeks later were stamped "secret" and shelved. Meanwhile, for nearly a year, the White House and intelligence officials continued to claim that the trailers were weapons factories.
The authors of the reports were nine US and British civilian experts - scientists and engineers with extensive experience in making bioweapons - who were dispatched to Baghdad by the Defence Intelligence Agency for an analysis of the trailers. Six of the experts - who did not want to be named - described their findings to a reporter from The Washington Post . Their accounts were verified by current and former government officials close to the mission.
The contents of the final report remain classified. But interviews reveal that the technical team was unequivocal in its conclusion that the trailers were not intended to manufacture biological weapons. "There was no connection to anything biological," said one expert who studied the trailers. Another said they were referred to as "the biggest sand toilets in the world"
The technical team's findings had no apparent impact on the intelligence agencies' public statements on the trailers. On May 28, 2003, a day after the team's report was sent to Washington, the CIA released its first formal assessment of the trailers, reflecting the views of its Washington analysts.
Throughout the rest of 2003 the trailers were referred to as "mobile biological laboratories" in Administration speeches and press statements. In June, the then secretary of state Colin Powell said the "confidence level is increasing" that the trailers were intended for biowarfare.
In September, Vice-President Dick Cheney said the trailers could have been used to produce anthrax or smallpox.
The technical team's preliminary report was transmitted on May 27, just before its members returned home. The final report remained unequivocal in declaring the trailers unsuitable for weapons production.
The team members returned to their jobs and watched as their work simply vanished. "I went home and fully expected that our findings would be publicly stated," one member said.
"It never happened. I just had to live with it."