Ever see this? This isn't known to "everyday" people...
http://www.yourbbsucks.com/forum/showthread.php?t=487
http://www.yourbbsucks.com/forum/showthread.php?t=487
At Satellite Courthouses, 9/11 Relatives Will Watch Moussaoui's Sentencing
- Thread starter Gold9472
- Start date
P
Partridge
Guest
Gold9472 said:
Oh yeah I agree. I thought you were raising some objection on point of law or something. For sure, they've probably done the same with all the prosecution's witnesses, but of course (ahem) 'they haven't'. As if they would do such a thing like that! ;-)
Moussaoui trial lawyer on administrative leave
TSA attorney violated witness rules, caused case to be halted
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/11857720/
Updated: 11:08 a.m. ET March 16, 2006
WASHINGTON - The lawyer whose coaching of witnesses in the death penalty case of Zacarias Moussaoui caused his trial to be halted was placed on administrative leave from her job, the Transportation Security Administration said Thursday.
That decision was confirmed by agency spokeswoman Yolanda Clark.
The TSA lawyer, Carla Martin, violated federal witness rules when she sent trial transcripts to seven aviation witnesses, coached them on how to deflect defense attacks and lied to defense lawyers to prevent them from interviewing witnesses they wanted to call, a federal judge Tuesday.
Martin's attorney, Roscoe Howard, did not immediately return calls seeking his comment on his client being placed on leave.
U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema said that Martin's actions and other government missteps had left the aviation evidence "irremediably contaminated," and the judge has excluded virtually half of the prosecution's case against the confessed al-Qaida conspirator.
The only person charged in this country in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Moussaoui pleaded guilty in April to conspiring with al-Qaida to fly airplanes into U.S. buildings. But he denies any involvement in 9/11, saying he was training for a possible future attack.
The trial in Alexandria, Va., is to decide whether he is executed or spends life behind bars.
TSA attorney violated witness rules, caused case to be halted
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/11857720/
Updated: 11:08 a.m. ET March 16, 2006
WASHINGTON - The lawyer whose coaching of witnesses in the death penalty case of Zacarias Moussaoui caused his trial to be halted was placed on administrative leave from her job, the Transportation Security Administration said Thursday.
That decision was confirmed by agency spokeswoman Yolanda Clark.
The TSA lawyer, Carla Martin, violated federal witness rules when she sent trial transcripts to seven aviation witnesses, coached them on how to deflect defense attacks and lied to defense lawyers to prevent them from interviewing witnesses they wanted to call, a federal judge Tuesday.
Martin's attorney, Roscoe Howard, did not immediately return calls seeking his comment on his client being placed on leave.
U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema said that Martin's actions and other government missteps had left the aviation evidence "irremediably contaminated," and the judge has excluded virtually half of the prosecution's case against the confessed al-Qaida conspirator.
The only person charged in this country in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Moussaoui pleaded guilty in April to conspiring with al-Qaida to fly airplanes into U.S. buildings. But he denies any involvement in 9/11, saying he was training for a possible future attack.
The trial in Alexandria, Va., is to decide whether he is executed or spends life behind bars.
P
Partridge
Guest
Is 'adminsitrative leave' some kind of euphamism for 'suspended with pay'?
Judge accepts government compromise offer on Moussaoui evidence
http://www.kget.com/news/national/story.aspx?content_id=ED5C234B-0692-4F09-B309-BC0FC346F7E4
3/17/2006
ALEXANDRIA, Va. (AP) - The judge in the death penalty trial of Zacarias Moussaoui has decided to allow the government to present substitute aviation security witnesses.
The decision partially reverses her ruling Tuesday to bar all aviation security testimony after the prosecution admitted a government lawyer coached witnesses.
The judge has issued a written order that says prosecutors can present exhibits and a witness or witnesses if they are untainted by contact with Transportation Security Administration lawyer Carla Martin.
The partial reversal helps prosecutors.
They have said it would be a waste of time to continue if couldn't present evidence about aviation security measures that could have been taken to prevent 9/11.
http://www.kget.com/news/national/story.aspx?content_id=ED5C234B-0692-4F09-B309-BC0FC346F7E4
3/17/2006
ALEXANDRIA, Va. (AP) - The judge in the death penalty trial of Zacarias Moussaoui has decided to allow the government to present substitute aviation security witnesses.
The decision partially reverses her ruling Tuesday to bar all aviation security testimony after the prosecution admitted a government lawyer coached witnesses.
The judge has issued a written order that says prosecutors can present exhibits and a witness or witnesses if they are untainted by contact with Transportation Security Administration lawyer Carla Martin.
The partial reversal helps prosecutors.
They have said it would be a waste of time to continue if couldn't present evidence about aviation security measures that could have been taken to prevent 9/11.
Missed 9/11 clues that mean life or death
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,11069-2087627,00.html
Foreign Editor's Briefing by Bronwen Maddox
3/18/2006
ALL that is now at stake is whether the US will execute Zacarias Moussaoui for his role in the September 11 attacks, or whether he will spend his life in jail.
Since his guilty plea, the so-called twentieth hijacker, who never made it on to the planes, has had no other future.
The life imprisonment option became more likely this week when the Government suffered a big blow to its case for the death penalty. That draws attention to the weakness of its central claim that it could have prevented the attacks, if it had just known a little bit more.
The trial was never going to be a quiet affair, given the stakes. Moussaoui, who stumbled into US custody a month before the attacks, having attracted attention at flight school by asking to learn to land and take off a 747 jet, is the only clear prosecution target, who was firmly in the legal system from the start, and not in the limbo of Guantanamo Bay. The drama this week is that Leonie Brinkema, the US district judge, threw out about half of the prosecution’s key witnesses because one of the prosecution’s lawyers had committed serious errors.
US television news yesterday was buzzing with pictures of Carla J. Martin, the federal attorney who single-handedly brought half the Government’s case crashing down. Ms Martin, a large woman with a curtain of platinum blonde hair, refused to speak as she strode out of the Alexandria courtroom in her unwanted starring role. She has taken on a lawyer of her own and been advised not to testify in court.
Her offences included telling defence lawyers — wrongly — that two witnesses would not speak to them, and briefing aviation security witnesses by showing them transcripts of the trial so far. Judge Brinkema said: “I don’t think in the annals of criminal law there has ever been a case with this many significant problems.”
The Government badly needed the aviation witnesses. To secure the death penalty, it needs to show that Moussaoui was responsible for at least one death on September 11, 2001.
The core of its case is that the FBI could have prevented the hijackings by tightening airport security and telling baggage checkers to look for knives, if Moussaoui had not “lied” by not revealing his terrorist connections when he was arrested in August.
If only he had told them he had links with al-Qaeda, then they would have been alarmed, and tightened security. That’s the gist of this part of the case.
But it is disingenuous. It goes without saying that if all kinds of people had told them more, they would have been prepared. It also ignores the many clues which had been missed. As George Tenet, the former head of the CIA, told the 9/11 Commission, by August, “the system was blinking red”.
The commission, set up by Congress and President Bush, calls Moussaoui “an al-Qaeda mistake”, because he was “an unreliable operative”. He was a “missed opportunity”, it says in its report, which became a national bestseller.
But he was not missed out of extreme neglect. Agents were pressing ahead on his case; Paris and London passed on new details as they came in, although too late. The report believes “a maximum US effort to investigate Moussaoui” might just have pointed to the plot. But the better chance, it suggests, was that more publicity about his arrest might have derailed the plotters.
The commission’s subtle chronicle of the slips of that summer, which also shows how easily they were made, has the force of plausibility. But the case the Government wants to bring against Moussaoui seems to depend on overstating its ability to have prevented 9/11.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,11069-2087627,00.html
Foreign Editor's Briefing by Bronwen Maddox
3/18/2006
ALL that is now at stake is whether the US will execute Zacarias Moussaoui for his role in the September 11 attacks, or whether he will spend his life in jail.
Since his guilty plea, the so-called twentieth hijacker, who never made it on to the planes, has had no other future.
The life imprisonment option became more likely this week when the Government suffered a big blow to its case for the death penalty. That draws attention to the weakness of its central claim that it could have prevented the attacks, if it had just known a little bit more.
The trial was never going to be a quiet affair, given the stakes. Moussaoui, who stumbled into US custody a month before the attacks, having attracted attention at flight school by asking to learn to land and take off a 747 jet, is the only clear prosecution target, who was firmly in the legal system from the start, and not in the limbo of Guantanamo Bay. The drama this week is that Leonie Brinkema, the US district judge, threw out about half of the prosecution’s key witnesses because one of the prosecution’s lawyers had committed serious errors.
US television news yesterday was buzzing with pictures of Carla J. Martin, the federal attorney who single-handedly brought half the Government’s case crashing down. Ms Martin, a large woman with a curtain of platinum blonde hair, refused to speak as she strode out of the Alexandria courtroom in her unwanted starring role. She has taken on a lawyer of her own and been advised not to testify in court.
Her offences included telling defence lawyers — wrongly — that two witnesses would not speak to them, and briefing aviation security witnesses by showing them transcripts of the trial so far. Judge Brinkema said: “I don’t think in the annals of criminal law there has ever been a case with this many significant problems.”
The Government badly needed the aviation witnesses. To secure the death penalty, it needs to show that Moussaoui was responsible for at least one death on September 11, 2001.
The core of its case is that the FBI could have prevented the hijackings by tightening airport security and telling baggage checkers to look for knives, if Moussaoui had not “lied” by not revealing his terrorist connections when he was arrested in August.
If only he had told them he had links with al-Qaeda, then they would have been alarmed, and tightened security. That’s the gist of this part of the case.
But it is disingenuous. It goes without saying that if all kinds of people had told them more, they would have been prepared. It also ignores the many clues which had been missed. As George Tenet, the former head of the CIA, told the 9/11 Commission, by August, “the system was blinking red”.
The commission, set up by Congress and President Bush, calls Moussaoui “an al-Qaeda mistake”, because he was “an unreliable operative”. He was a “missed opportunity”, it says in its report, which became a national bestseller.
But he was not missed out of extreme neglect. Agents were pressing ahead on his case; Paris and London passed on new details as they came in, although too late. The report believes “a maximum US effort to investigate Moussaoui” might just have pointed to the plot. But the better chance, it suggests, was that more publicity about his arrest might have derailed the plotters.
The commission’s subtle chronicle of the slips of that summer, which also shows how easily they were made, has the force of plausibility. But the case the Government wants to bring against Moussaoui seems to depend on overstating its ability to have prevented 9/11.
Judge Accepts Compromise Deal on Moussaoui
http://www.chippewa.com/articles/2006/03/16/ap/headlines/d8gdhuqo0.txt
By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN and MATTHEW BARAKAT
Published: Friday, March 17, 2006 2:51 PM CST
ALEXANDRIA, Va. - The federal judge in the death penalty trial of al-Qaida conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui accepted a government compromise Friday that will allow prosecutors to present new witnesses about aviation security.
Judge Leonie Brinkema in a written order said prosecutors could present exhibits and a witness or witnesses if they are untainted by contact with Transportation Security Administration lawyer Carla J. Martin, cited by Brinkema for misconduct earlier this week when the judge decided to exclude all aviation security evidence.
"The government's proposed alternative remedy of allowing it to call untainted aviation witnesses or otherwise produce evidence not tainted by Ms. Martin has merit," Brinkema wrote.
Her partial reversal of an earlier order was a boon to prosecutors who had said it would be a waste of time to continue the case if they were not allowed to present some evidence about possible defensive aviation security measures the government might have taken to prevent the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Justice Department spokeswoman Tasia Scolinos signaled that the prosecution was prepared to resume its case on Monday. "We're pleased to be able to move forward with this important case on behalf of the thousands of victims and their families," Scolinos said.
Defense lawyers had argued Thursday that Brinkema was fully justified in concluding that evidence about U.S. aviation security was tainted beyond repair.
Moussaoui's lawyers also had said that there was no reason for her to agree to a request by prosecutors on Wednesday that she revoke her order or at least impose less severe penalties on the government.
Brinkema has sent the jury home until Monday while she decides what to do.
The only person charged in this country in the Sept. 11 attacks, Moussaoui pleaded guilty in April to conspiring with al-Qaida. But he says he had nothing to do with 9/11 and was training for a possible later attack.
To obtain a death penalty, prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions _ his lies, in this case _ led directly to at least one death on Sept. 11, 2001.
Martin's lawyer, Roscoe Howard, said Thursday she had been "viciously vilified by assertions from the prosecution" and is preparing a response he said "will show a very different, full picture of her intentions, her conduct and her tireless dedication to a fair trial."
Meanwhile, in New York, lawyers representing plaintiffs in a liability lawsuit stemming from the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks have asked a judge there to conduct an inquiry into whether Martin, or any other TSA lawyers, engaged in witness tampering or other acts to favor American Airlines and United Airlines, defendants in the case.
"We are particularly concerned that TSA may not have acted with the total impartiality required of that Agency in decisions it has made that affect our cases," lawyers Marc S. Moller and Beth E. Goldman wrote in a letter to U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, who is overseeing the civil lawsuit over property damages that resulted from the terrorist attacks.
On the Net:
Court's Moussaoui site: http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/index.html
http://www.chippewa.com/articles/2006/03/16/ap/headlines/d8gdhuqo0.txt
By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN and MATTHEW BARAKAT
Published: Friday, March 17, 2006 2:51 PM CST
ALEXANDRIA, Va. - The federal judge in the death penalty trial of al-Qaida conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui accepted a government compromise Friday that will allow prosecutors to present new witnesses about aviation security.
Judge Leonie Brinkema in a written order said prosecutors could present exhibits and a witness or witnesses if they are untainted by contact with Transportation Security Administration lawyer Carla J. Martin, cited by Brinkema for misconduct earlier this week when the judge decided to exclude all aviation security evidence.
"The government's proposed alternative remedy of allowing it to call untainted aviation witnesses or otherwise produce evidence not tainted by Ms. Martin has merit," Brinkema wrote.
Her partial reversal of an earlier order was a boon to prosecutors who had said it would be a waste of time to continue the case if they were not allowed to present some evidence about possible defensive aviation security measures the government might have taken to prevent the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Justice Department spokeswoman Tasia Scolinos signaled that the prosecution was prepared to resume its case on Monday. "We're pleased to be able to move forward with this important case on behalf of the thousands of victims and their families," Scolinos said.
Defense lawyers had argued Thursday that Brinkema was fully justified in concluding that evidence about U.S. aviation security was tainted beyond repair.
Moussaoui's lawyers also had said that there was no reason for her to agree to a request by prosecutors on Wednesday that she revoke her order or at least impose less severe penalties on the government.
Brinkema has sent the jury home until Monday while she decides what to do.
The only person charged in this country in the Sept. 11 attacks, Moussaoui pleaded guilty in April to conspiring with al-Qaida. But he says he had nothing to do with 9/11 and was training for a possible later attack.
To obtain a death penalty, prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions _ his lies, in this case _ led directly to at least one death on Sept. 11, 2001.
Martin's lawyer, Roscoe Howard, said Thursday she had been "viciously vilified by assertions from the prosecution" and is preparing a response he said "will show a very different, full picture of her intentions, her conduct and her tireless dedication to a fair trial."
Meanwhile, in New York, lawyers representing plaintiffs in a liability lawsuit stemming from the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks have asked a judge there to conduct an inquiry into whether Martin, or any other TSA lawyers, engaged in witness tampering or other acts to favor American Airlines and United Airlines, defendants in the case.
"We are particularly concerned that TSA may not have acted with the total impartiality required of that Agency in decisions it has made that affect our cases," lawyers Marc S. Moller and Beth E. Goldman wrote in a letter to U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, who is overseeing the civil lawsuit over property damages that resulted from the terrorist attacks.
On the Net:
Court's Moussaoui site: http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/index.html
Lawyers: Coaching was to aid 9/11 airlines
http://www.oregonlive.com/newsflash...-61/1142599456131850.xml&storylist=ornational
By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN and LESLIE MILLER
The Associated Press
3/17/2006, 2:59 p.m. PT
WASHINGTON (AP) — Lawyers for two airlines being sued by 9/11 victims prompted a federal attorney to coach witnesses in the Zacarias Moussaoui death penalty trial so the government's case against the al-Qaida conspirator would not undercut their defense, victims' lawyers allege.
A United Airlines lawyer received a transcript of the first day of the Moussaoui trial from an American Airlines lawyer and forwarded it to Carla J. Martin, a Transportation Security Administration lawyer, the victims' lawyers, Robert Clifford and Gregory Joseph, claim.
Martin's attorney, former federal prosecutor Roscoe C. Howard, acknowledged that his client and United attorney Jeff Ellis were close friends and had talked about the two cases. "But I don't think there is any collaboration between them," Howard said.
He dismissed the Clifford and Joseph letter as the work of aggressive lawyers who "want to take a look at all the documents in the Moussaoui case" to see if they might help their clients.
Martin forwarded that day's transcript to seven federal aviation officials scheduled to testify later in the sentencing trial of the 37-year-old Frenchman, in violation of an order by Moussaoui trial judge Leonie Brinkema.
Martin's e-mailing of the transcript and her efforts to shape their testimony prompted Brinkema to toss out half the government's case against Moussaoui as contaminated beyond repair.
American Airlines attorneys denied on Friday that the government position in the Moussaoui case would have undercut their defense in the civil suit and said that none of their attorneys had any direct contact with Martin about the Moussaoui trial.
The contacts between Martin and airline lawyers were detailed in a legal brief filed on Moussaoui's behalf Thursday. That brief contained a March 15 letter from Clifford and Joseph complaining about Martin's actions to U.S. District Judge Alvin Hellerstein, who is presiding over the civil damage case in New York.
They wrote Hellerstein that the government's opening statement in the Moussaoui case "took the position that the hijackings were completely preventable and that gate security measures could have been implemented to prevent the 9/11 hijackers from boarding the planes had security been on the look out for short-bladed knives and boxcutters."
"This stands in stark contrast to the position that has been repeatedly articulated by counsel to the aviation defendants in the September 11 actions."
Because that government position could have a "devastating" impact on the airlines' defense in the civil suit, American Airlines' lawyer forwarded the transcript to a United Air Lines lawyer who forwarded it to Martin, Clifford and Joseph wrote. As proof, they cited March 7 e-mails that they provided to Hellerstein.
The e-mails they sent Hellerstein were made public in the Moussaoui case this week as part of the investigation of Martin's actions. They show that on March 7 Maia Selinger, a legal assistant at a New York law firm that represents American Airlines in the civil suits, sent the first day's trial transcript to Christopher R. Christensen, an American Airlines lawyer, who in turn forwarded the transcript to United lawyer Ellis. Ellis then forwarded the transcript to the TSA's Martin.
But none of the e-mails by airline attorneys in which the transcript was forwarded contained any text message at all, much less explaining why they were forwarding a transcript that was publicly available on the Internet.
"The TSA lawyer then forwarded the transcripts and sent multiple e-mails to government witnesses in a clear effort to shape their testimony in a manner that would be beneficial to the aviation defendants" in the civil suit, Clifford and Joseph wrote.
They then quoted a March 8 e-mail Martin sent to one of the government's Moussaoui witnesses that said:
"My friends Jeff Ellis and Chris Christenson, NY lawyers rep. UAL and AAL respectively in the 9/11 civil litigation ... all of us aviation lawyers, were stunned by the opening. The opening has created a credibility gap that the defense can drive a truck through. There is no way anyone could say that the carriers could have prevented all short-bladed knives from going through — (Prosecutor) Dave (Novak) MUST elicit that from you and the airline witnesses on direct...."
Clifford and Joseph said the developments represent "far more than appearance of impropriety" and asked Hellerstein to investigate "the mutual back-scratching relationship that appears to exist between the (airline) defendants and the TSA."
Meantime, Marc S. Moller, an attorney for 9/11 families seeking damages for deaths or injuries, wrote Hellerstein that he wanted to depose Martin and the seven government officials she contacted because "we are particularly concerned that TSA may not have acted with total impartiality ... in decisions it has made that affect our cases." Moller stressed that he was making no allegations of impropriety.
Asked about the allegations by Clifford and Joseph, United spokeswoman Robin Urbanski said, "Our actions have been entirely appropriate as have those of our outside counsel."
In a letter dated Thursday to Hellerstein, American Airlines' attorneys Desmond Barry and Roger Podesta wrote that the "assertion that a government admission of devastating significance to the defense of this case has somehow been made in the Moussaoui trial is just plain wrong."
They said the airlines have always maintained that their actions on 9/11 should be measured against whatever security standard federal aviation authorities imposed at the time. They said the government position in the Moussaoui trial — that security would have been tightened if Moussaoui had not lied about his terrorist connections when arrested in August 2001 — is irrelevant to their defense because the standards they were supposed to meet were not changed.
They added, "There have been no communications between any counsel for American Airlines and Carla Martin or anyone else at the TSA regarding the Moussaoui trial." And they said Christensen specifically had no communications with her at all "in approximately one year." They noted Martin had misspelled Christensen's name as Christenson.
TSA spokeswoman Yolanda Clark said she was unfamiliar with the allegations made by Clifford and Joseph.
Earlier Thursday, Clark confirmed that TSA had put Martin on administrative leave.
On Tuesday, Brinkema said Martin violated federal rules when she sent trial transcripts to seven aviation witnesses, coached them on how to deflect defense attacks and lied to defense lawyers to prevent them from interviewing witnesses they wanted to call.
Brinkema warned her she could face civil or criminal charges and appeared to have violated rules of legal ethics.
Martin was a government lawyer for the aviation witnesses called by both sides and liaison between them and prosecutors and defense attorneys. Beyond that, she co-signed one government brief submitted in the case, attended closed hearings on classified documents and worked closely with prosecutors preparing their exhibits.
http://www.oregonlive.com/newsflash...-61/1142599456131850.xml&storylist=ornational
By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN and LESLIE MILLER
The Associated Press
3/17/2006, 2:59 p.m. PT
WASHINGTON (AP) — Lawyers for two airlines being sued by 9/11 victims prompted a federal attorney to coach witnesses in the Zacarias Moussaoui death penalty trial so the government's case against the al-Qaida conspirator would not undercut their defense, victims' lawyers allege.
A United Airlines lawyer received a transcript of the first day of the Moussaoui trial from an American Airlines lawyer and forwarded it to Carla J. Martin, a Transportation Security Administration lawyer, the victims' lawyers, Robert Clifford and Gregory Joseph, claim.
Martin's attorney, former federal prosecutor Roscoe C. Howard, acknowledged that his client and United attorney Jeff Ellis were close friends and had talked about the two cases. "But I don't think there is any collaboration between them," Howard said.
He dismissed the Clifford and Joseph letter as the work of aggressive lawyers who "want to take a look at all the documents in the Moussaoui case" to see if they might help their clients.
Martin forwarded that day's transcript to seven federal aviation officials scheduled to testify later in the sentencing trial of the 37-year-old Frenchman, in violation of an order by Moussaoui trial judge Leonie Brinkema.
Martin's e-mailing of the transcript and her efforts to shape their testimony prompted Brinkema to toss out half the government's case against Moussaoui as contaminated beyond repair.
American Airlines attorneys denied on Friday that the government position in the Moussaoui case would have undercut their defense in the civil suit and said that none of their attorneys had any direct contact with Martin about the Moussaoui trial.
The contacts between Martin and airline lawyers were detailed in a legal brief filed on Moussaoui's behalf Thursday. That brief contained a March 15 letter from Clifford and Joseph complaining about Martin's actions to U.S. District Judge Alvin Hellerstein, who is presiding over the civil damage case in New York.
They wrote Hellerstein that the government's opening statement in the Moussaoui case "took the position that the hijackings were completely preventable and that gate security measures could have been implemented to prevent the 9/11 hijackers from boarding the planes had security been on the look out for short-bladed knives and boxcutters."
"This stands in stark contrast to the position that has been repeatedly articulated by counsel to the aviation defendants in the September 11 actions."
Because that government position could have a "devastating" impact on the airlines' defense in the civil suit, American Airlines' lawyer forwarded the transcript to a United Air Lines lawyer who forwarded it to Martin, Clifford and Joseph wrote. As proof, they cited March 7 e-mails that they provided to Hellerstein.
The e-mails they sent Hellerstein were made public in the Moussaoui case this week as part of the investigation of Martin's actions. They show that on March 7 Maia Selinger, a legal assistant at a New York law firm that represents American Airlines in the civil suits, sent the first day's trial transcript to Christopher R. Christensen, an American Airlines lawyer, who in turn forwarded the transcript to United lawyer Ellis. Ellis then forwarded the transcript to the TSA's Martin.
But none of the e-mails by airline attorneys in which the transcript was forwarded contained any text message at all, much less explaining why they were forwarding a transcript that was publicly available on the Internet.
"The TSA lawyer then forwarded the transcripts and sent multiple e-mails to government witnesses in a clear effort to shape their testimony in a manner that would be beneficial to the aviation defendants" in the civil suit, Clifford and Joseph wrote.
They then quoted a March 8 e-mail Martin sent to one of the government's Moussaoui witnesses that said:
"My friends Jeff Ellis and Chris Christenson, NY lawyers rep. UAL and AAL respectively in the 9/11 civil litigation ... all of us aviation lawyers, were stunned by the opening. The opening has created a credibility gap that the defense can drive a truck through. There is no way anyone could say that the carriers could have prevented all short-bladed knives from going through — (Prosecutor) Dave (Novak) MUST elicit that from you and the airline witnesses on direct...."
Clifford and Joseph said the developments represent "far more than appearance of impropriety" and asked Hellerstein to investigate "the mutual back-scratching relationship that appears to exist between the (airline) defendants and the TSA."
Meantime, Marc S. Moller, an attorney for 9/11 families seeking damages for deaths or injuries, wrote Hellerstein that he wanted to depose Martin and the seven government officials she contacted because "we are particularly concerned that TSA may not have acted with total impartiality ... in decisions it has made that affect our cases." Moller stressed that he was making no allegations of impropriety.
Asked about the allegations by Clifford and Joseph, United spokeswoman Robin Urbanski said, "Our actions have been entirely appropriate as have those of our outside counsel."
In a letter dated Thursday to Hellerstein, American Airlines' attorneys Desmond Barry and Roger Podesta wrote that the "assertion that a government admission of devastating significance to the defense of this case has somehow been made in the Moussaoui trial is just plain wrong."
They said the airlines have always maintained that their actions on 9/11 should be measured against whatever security standard federal aviation authorities imposed at the time. They said the government position in the Moussaoui trial — that security would have been tightened if Moussaoui had not lied about his terrorist connections when arrested in August 2001 — is irrelevant to their defense because the standards they were supposed to meet were not changed.
They added, "There have been no communications between any counsel for American Airlines and Carla Martin or anyone else at the TSA regarding the Moussaoui trial." And they said Christensen specifically had no communications with her at all "in approximately one year." They noted Martin had misspelled Christensen's name as Christenson.
TSA spokeswoman Yolanda Clark said she was unfamiliar with the allegations made by Clifford and Joseph.
Earlier Thursday, Clark confirmed that TSA had put Martin on administrative leave.
On Tuesday, Brinkema said Martin violated federal rules when she sent trial transcripts to seven aviation witnesses, coached them on how to deflect defense attacks and lied to defense lawyers to prevent them from interviewing witnesses they wanted to call.
Brinkema warned her she could face civil or criminal charges and appeared to have violated rules of legal ethics.
Martin was a government lawyer for the aviation witnesses called by both sides and liaison between them and prosecutors and defense attorneys. Beyond that, she co-signed one government brief submitted in the case, attended closed hearings on classified documents and worked closely with prosecutors preparing their exhibits.
9/11 Families Blast TSA for Excessive Secrecy, Abuse of Power
Urge Congress to Compel Agency to Release Pre-9/11 Documents Wrongfully Kept from Families
http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/060314/dctu025.html?.v=48
Tuesday March 14, 10:39 am ET
WASHINGTON, March 14 /PRNewswire/ -- Charging the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) with wrongfully denying them access to documents once in the public domain, the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism today called on Congress to force TSA to change its practices on classifying materials as "Sensitive Security Information" (SSI).
"Why has TSA provided documents to attorneys for an admitted terrorist, Zacarias Moussaoui, but denied them to us?" asked Julie Sweeney Roth of Yarmouthport, Mass., whose husband, Brian Sweeney, was a passenger on United flight 175. "Whose side is TSA on?"
"The truth is our most powerful weapon in the war on terrorism," said Alice Hoglan of Los Gatos, California, mother of Mark Bingham, one of the United flight 93 passengers who charged the hijackers and prevented the airplane from being crashed into either the Capitol or the White House. Contending that TSA would be fulfilling its responsibility to protect the nation's transportation system by releasing the information the families are requesting, Hoglan said, "It was because my son and his fellow passengers learned the truth about the hijackers' intentions that they were able to save countless lives as their final, brave act. That is why I am outraged that TSA is trying to hide the truth and making Americans less safe."
"SSI should have a different acronym -- CYA," said Dr. Stephen Alderman of Bedford, N.Y., whose son, Peter Alderman, died at the World Trade Center. "The materials we're requesting deal with pre-9/11 security procedures that have changed, making them of no use to would-be terrorists. Some aired on national television and were published in newspapers. TSA's only conceivable motive is avoiding embarrassment or protecting the airlines."
Sweeney Roth, Dr. Alderman, and his wife, Elizabeth, are among a group of 9/11 family members meeting with members of Congress today as part of an effort to educate U.S. senators and representatives about the problems at TSA and to change TSA's SSI practices.
Congress created the SSI designation to enable TSA to prevent the release of information that the agency determines presents a threat to the nation's transportation system. The 9/11 Families made clear that they are not challenging TSA's right to withhold information that could present a genuine security threat. Instead, they charged that TSA is abusing its authority by stamping as SSI and keeping secret a host of materials that clearly pose no threat whatsoever -- including many documents once openly available but now shrouded in secrecy.
TSA's classification of these documents and its insistence that its SSI decisions are essentially unreviewable brazenly violate the intent of Congress, the families charged. They cited a June 2005 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, Congress' investigative arm, blasting TSA for its failure to implement adequate policies, guidance, procedures, internal controls and training regarding the SSI process. Though TSA claims to have subsequently set in place a structure for reviewing SSI, the agency has still failed to offer any guidelines by which it trains its employees to determine what is and is not SSI, despite many congressional requests.
The 9/11 Families charged that many of TSA's SSI classifications "are so absurd, they turn real life into satire." For example:
When the videotape showing hijackers passing through security at Washington Dulles airport on 9/11 was aired on NBC, TSA issued a two-line press release boasting that it "strongly validates the dramatic changes that TSA has made in the world of aviation security." Now, TSA has classified the tape as SSI. Yet TSA itself released a similar videotape showing lead hijacker Mohammed Atta passing through security at the airport in Portland, Maine, on 9/11.
TSA has taken material that has long been in the public domain -- including information published in the Congressional Record and major newspapers -- and labeled it SSI.
TSA has classified as SSI the five Federal Aviation Administration warnings to the airlines issued in the months before 9/11, despite the fact that they were quoted in the 9/11 Commission's report and discussed in public testimony.
The 9/11 Families also noted that TSA's policies resulted in the dismissal of charges against a baggage handler, who had been caught stealing from a passenger's luggage, because TSA labeled incriminating materials as SSI and refused to turn them over to the Court.
The 9/11 Families are urging Congress to compel TSA to fulfill the families' requests for access to pre-9/11 documents and materials that were once publicly available. They noted that a House Appropriations Subcommittee wrote last year that it "expects the Department to try to release as much, not as little, information to the public as possible" and that U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein said from the bench that TSA's conduct in reviewing SSI "is cruel and inhuman to the people involved."
Some of the 9/11 Families are plaintiffs in litigation against the airlines and are seeking documents withheld by TSA, but others who are not are joining the effort to educate Congress about TSA's abuse of its authority to keep information secret. "This is a matter of principle," said Hoglan, who settled with the Victims' Compensation Fund and thus cannot sue the airlines. "It's about our right to know the truth about why our loved ones were killed. It's about protecting our democracy and our system of checks and balances."
The 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism represents 6,161 survivors and family members of those who died in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The 9/11 Families are seeking to hold al Qaeda's financiers accountable for their central role in these atrocities and to make America safer by cutting off the financial pipeline fueling global terrorism.
Urge Congress to Compel Agency to Release Pre-9/11 Documents Wrongfully Kept from Families
http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/060314/dctu025.html?.v=48
Tuesday March 14, 10:39 am ET
WASHINGTON, March 14 /PRNewswire/ -- Charging the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) with wrongfully denying them access to documents once in the public domain, the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism today called on Congress to force TSA to change its practices on classifying materials as "Sensitive Security Information" (SSI).
"Why has TSA provided documents to attorneys for an admitted terrorist, Zacarias Moussaoui, but denied them to us?" asked Julie Sweeney Roth of Yarmouthport, Mass., whose husband, Brian Sweeney, was a passenger on United flight 175. "Whose side is TSA on?"
"The truth is our most powerful weapon in the war on terrorism," said Alice Hoglan of Los Gatos, California, mother of Mark Bingham, one of the United flight 93 passengers who charged the hijackers and prevented the airplane from being crashed into either the Capitol or the White House. Contending that TSA would be fulfilling its responsibility to protect the nation's transportation system by releasing the information the families are requesting, Hoglan said, "It was because my son and his fellow passengers learned the truth about the hijackers' intentions that they were able to save countless lives as their final, brave act. That is why I am outraged that TSA is trying to hide the truth and making Americans less safe."
"SSI should have a different acronym -- CYA," said Dr. Stephen Alderman of Bedford, N.Y., whose son, Peter Alderman, died at the World Trade Center. "The materials we're requesting deal with pre-9/11 security procedures that have changed, making them of no use to would-be terrorists. Some aired on national television and were published in newspapers. TSA's only conceivable motive is avoiding embarrassment or protecting the airlines."
Sweeney Roth, Dr. Alderman, and his wife, Elizabeth, are among a group of 9/11 family members meeting with members of Congress today as part of an effort to educate U.S. senators and representatives about the problems at TSA and to change TSA's SSI practices.
Congress created the SSI designation to enable TSA to prevent the release of information that the agency determines presents a threat to the nation's transportation system. The 9/11 Families made clear that they are not challenging TSA's right to withhold information that could present a genuine security threat. Instead, they charged that TSA is abusing its authority by stamping as SSI and keeping secret a host of materials that clearly pose no threat whatsoever -- including many documents once openly available but now shrouded in secrecy.
TSA's classification of these documents and its insistence that its SSI decisions are essentially unreviewable brazenly violate the intent of Congress, the families charged. They cited a June 2005 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, Congress' investigative arm, blasting TSA for its failure to implement adequate policies, guidance, procedures, internal controls and training regarding the SSI process. Though TSA claims to have subsequently set in place a structure for reviewing SSI, the agency has still failed to offer any guidelines by which it trains its employees to determine what is and is not SSI, despite many congressional requests.
The 9/11 Families charged that many of TSA's SSI classifications "are so absurd, they turn real life into satire." For example:
When the videotape showing hijackers passing through security at Washington Dulles airport on 9/11 was aired on NBC, TSA issued a two-line press release boasting that it "strongly validates the dramatic changes that TSA has made in the world of aviation security." Now, TSA has classified the tape as SSI. Yet TSA itself released a similar videotape showing lead hijacker Mohammed Atta passing through security at the airport in Portland, Maine, on 9/11.
TSA has taken material that has long been in the public domain -- including information published in the Congressional Record and major newspapers -- and labeled it SSI.
TSA has classified as SSI the five Federal Aviation Administration warnings to the airlines issued in the months before 9/11, despite the fact that they were quoted in the 9/11 Commission's report and discussed in public testimony.
The 9/11 Families also noted that TSA's policies resulted in the dismissal of charges against a baggage handler, who had been caught stealing from a passenger's luggage, because TSA labeled incriminating materials as SSI and refused to turn them over to the Court.
The 9/11 Families are urging Congress to compel TSA to fulfill the families' requests for access to pre-9/11 documents and materials that were once publicly available. They noted that a House Appropriations Subcommittee wrote last year that it "expects the Department to try to release as much, not as little, information to the public as possible" and that U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein said from the bench that TSA's conduct in reviewing SSI "is cruel and inhuman to the people involved."
Some of the 9/11 Families are plaintiffs in litigation against the airlines and are seeking documents withheld by TSA, but others who are not are joining the effort to educate Congress about TSA's abuse of its authority to keep information secret. "This is a matter of principle," said Hoglan, who settled with the Victims' Compensation Fund and thus cannot sue the airlines. "It's about our right to know the truth about why our loved ones were killed. It's about protecting our democracy and our system of checks and balances."
The 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism represents 6,161 survivors and family members of those who died in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The 9/11 Families are seeking to hold al Qaeda's financiers accountable for their central role in these atrocities and to make America safer by cutting off the financial pipeline fueling global terrorism.
FBI agent: warnings about Moussaoui unheeded
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060320/ts_nm/security_moussaoui_dc
By Deborah Charles 1 hour, 1 minute ago
ALEXANDRIA, Virginia (Reuters) - An FBI agent testified in the sentencing trial of September 11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui on Monday that agency superiors repeatedly blocked his efforts to warn of a possible terror attack.
Harry Samit, the FBI agent who arrested Moussaoui three weeks before the deadly airliner hijackings that killed 3,000 people, said he tried to tell his superiors that he thought a hijacking plan might be in the works.
"You tried to move heaven and earth to get a search warrant to search this man's belongings. You were obstructed," defense attorney Edward MacMahon said as the trial resumed after a week's delay over improper witness coaching.
"From a particular individual in the (FBI's) Radical Fundamentalist Unit, yes sir, I was obstructed," Samit said.
Moussaoui has already pleaded guilty to six charges of conspiracy. The trial -- the only one for anyone charged in connection with the September 11 attacks -- will determine if he is sentenced to death.
Moussaoui, an admitted al Qaeda member who regularly yells "God curse America!" when the jury and judge leave the courtroom, was arrested on August 16, 2001, after raising suspicions at a flight school.
Samit said after questioning Moussaoui he knew the Frenchman of Moroccan descent had "radical Islamic fundamentalist beliefs" and thought he was part of a bigger plot to attack the United States. In an message to his superiors on August 18, 2001, Samit said he believed Moussaoui was "conspiring to commit a terrorist act."
Samit also warned that Moussaoui, who did not have a pilot's license, had been taking simulator lessons to learn the basics of flying a jumbo jet. Samit expressed his concerns that Moussaoui was plotting a possible hijacking.
WARNINGS GO UNHEEDED
"You thought you had a terrorist who was planning a terrorist attack. And you wanted everyone in the government to know," MacMahon asked Samit.
"Yes," he replied.
Although he sent numerous e-mails and formal requests to agents and to his superiors warning of a potential hijacking attack, Samit said he was unable to get authority to seek a warrant in order to search Moussaoui's belongings.
He even sought assistance from FBI agents in France and Britain and consulted with people in different agencies.
"I am so desperate to get into his computer, I'll take anything," he wrote in an e-mail to Catherine Kiser, an intelligence official, one day before the deadly attacks.
Her response was ominous: "You fought the good fight. God help us all if the next terrorist incident involves the same type of plane."
Samit also drafted a memo to the Federal Aviation Administration warning that Moussaoui might have been part of a plot to seize a jumbo jet but it was not clear "how far advanced were his plans to do so." Samit's bosses at FBI headquarters did not send the memo.
MacMahon quoted from a report in which Samit accused people at FBI headquarters of "criminal negligence" and said they were just trying to protect their own careers.
The trial resumed on Monday after a week's delay caused by the discovery that a Transportation Security Administration lawyer, Carla Martin, had improperly discussed the trial with aviation witnesses who were to testify for the defense and the prosecution.
After initially throwing out all aviation-related evidence and testimony, U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema agreed to allow the government to bring forward new "untainted" witnesses and evidence, but limited the parameters for the questioning.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060320/ts_nm/security_moussaoui_dc
By Deborah Charles 1 hour, 1 minute ago
ALEXANDRIA, Virginia (Reuters) - An FBI agent testified in the sentencing trial of September 11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui on Monday that agency superiors repeatedly blocked his efforts to warn of a possible terror attack.
Harry Samit, the FBI agent who arrested Moussaoui three weeks before the deadly airliner hijackings that killed 3,000 people, said he tried to tell his superiors that he thought a hijacking plan might be in the works.
"You tried to move heaven and earth to get a search warrant to search this man's belongings. You were obstructed," defense attorney Edward MacMahon said as the trial resumed after a week's delay over improper witness coaching.
"From a particular individual in the (FBI's) Radical Fundamentalist Unit, yes sir, I was obstructed," Samit said.
Moussaoui has already pleaded guilty to six charges of conspiracy. The trial -- the only one for anyone charged in connection with the September 11 attacks -- will determine if he is sentenced to death.
Moussaoui, an admitted al Qaeda member who regularly yells "God curse America!" when the jury and judge leave the courtroom, was arrested on August 16, 2001, after raising suspicions at a flight school.
Samit said after questioning Moussaoui he knew the Frenchman of Moroccan descent had "radical Islamic fundamentalist beliefs" and thought he was part of a bigger plot to attack the United States. In an message to his superiors on August 18, 2001, Samit said he believed Moussaoui was "conspiring to commit a terrorist act."
Samit also warned that Moussaoui, who did not have a pilot's license, had been taking simulator lessons to learn the basics of flying a jumbo jet. Samit expressed his concerns that Moussaoui was plotting a possible hijacking.
WARNINGS GO UNHEEDED
"You thought you had a terrorist who was planning a terrorist attack. And you wanted everyone in the government to know," MacMahon asked Samit.
"Yes," he replied.
Although he sent numerous e-mails and formal requests to agents and to his superiors warning of a potential hijacking attack, Samit said he was unable to get authority to seek a warrant in order to search Moussaoui's belongings.
He even sought assistance from FBI agents in France and Britain and consulted with people in different agencies.
"I am so desperate to get into his computer, I'll take anything," he wrote in an e-mail to Catherine Kiser, an intelligence official, one day before the deadly attacks.
Her response was ominous: "You fought the good fight. God help us all if the next terrorist incident involves the same type of plane."
Samit also drafted a memo to the Federal Aviation Administration warning that Moussaoui might have been part of a plot to seize a jumbo jet but it was not clear "how far advanced were his plans to do so." Samit's bosses at FBI headquarters did not send the memo.
MacMahon quoted from a report in which Samit accused people at FBI headquarters of "criminal negligence" and said they were just trying to protect their own careers.
The trial resumed on Monday after a week's delay caused by the discovery that a Transportation Security Administration lawyer, Carla Martin, had improperly discussed the trial with aviation witnesses who were to testify for the defense and the prosecution.
After initially throwing out all aviation-related evidence and testimony, U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema agreed to allow the government to bring forward new "untainted" witnesses and evidence, but limited the parameters for the questioning.
P
Partridge
Guest
From the NYT
F.B.I. Discounted Suspicions About Moussaoui, Agent Says
By NEIL A. LEWIS
Published: March 20, 2006
ALEXANDRIA, Va., March 20 — The F.B.I. agent who arrested and interrogated Zacarias Moussaoui just weeks before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, told a jury today that his efforts to confirm his strong suspicions that Mr. Moussaoui was involved in a terrorist airline hijacking plot were thwarted by senior bureau officials in Washington who acted out of negligence and a need to protect their careers.
Harry Samit, under intense cross-examination by Mr. Moussaoui's chief court-appointed lawyer, detailed his frustration over the days before the hijacking as he made numerous requests to look into what Mr. Moussaoui had been up to at the time of his arrest. Mr. Moussaoui was arrested on immigration violations in Minnesota, where he was learning to fly a jetliner.
"I accused the people in F.B.I. headquarters of criminal negligence" in an interview after Sept. 11, Mr. Samit acknowledged under questioning by Edward B. MacMahon Jr. He said that the senior agents in Washington "took a calculated risk not to advance the investigation" by refusing to seek search warrants for Mr. Moussaoui's belongings and computer. "The wager was a national tragedy," Mr. Samit testified.
Mr. Samit said that two senior agents declined to provide help in getting a search warrant, either through a special panel of judges that considers applications for foreign intelligence cases or through a normal application to any federal court for a criminal investigation.
As a field agent in Minnesota, he said he required help and approval from headquarters to continue his investigation. He acknowledged that he had written that Michael Maltbie, an agent in the F.B.I.'s radical fundamentalist unit, told him that applications for the special intelligence court warrants had proved troublesome for the bureau and seeking one "was just the kind of thing that would get F.B.I. agents in trouble." He wrote that Mr. Maltbie had told him that "he was not about to let that happen to him." During that period, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court, had complained about improper applications from the bureau.
Mr. Samit also acknowledged that he had written that David Frasca, a supervisor of the radical fundamentalist unit, had similarly blocked him from seeking a search warrant under the more common route in a criminal investigation. Some of the special court's complaints dealt with the idea that law-enforcement officials were sometimes using the lower standard required for warrants in intelligence investigations and then using the information they obtained in criminal cases.
Mr. Frasca, Mr. Samit explained, believed that once the Moussaoui investigation was opened as an intelligence investigation, it would arouse suspicion that agents had been trying to exploit the intelligence law to get information for an investigation they now believed was a criminal one.
(An F.B.I. spokesman, Bill Carter, said the agency did not comment on pending trials or litigation.)
The distinction between the two standards for obtaining warrants has since been eliminated following the Sept. 11 attacks.
The government is trying to prove to a jury that Mr. Moussaoui should be executed because he bears some responsibility for the deaths from Sept. 11. Prosecutors have argued that if Mr. Moussaoui had told Mr. Samit and other investigators what he knew about Al Qaeda plots to fly planes into buildings, the attacks might have been foiled.
Although Mr. Samit was a government witness who sought to bolster the government's case that he could have uncovered the plot had Mr. Moussaoui spoken to him truthfully, his responses to Mr. MacMahon today appeared to provide a lift for the defense. Mr. MacMahon sought to show that the problem was not with Mr. Moussaoui but with senior F.B.I. officials in Washington who would not budge no matter how hard Mr. Samit pressed them.
The F.B.I.'s handling of clues to the impending Sept. 11 attacks was sharply criticized in a report by the Justice Department's inspector general's office in 2004. Citing a memo from a Phoenix agent who had become suspicious of several students taking flying lessons in Arizona, the report said the agent's memo did not get the timely attention it deserved, not so much because of individual lapses within the F.B.I. but because of "critical systemic failings" that kept information from being effectively evaluated and shared.
The slow and incomplete attention given the memo from Phoenix was illustrative of a system "in which important information could easily 'fall through the cracks' and not be brought to the attention of the people who needed it, the inspector general's office concluded.
F.B.I. Discounted Suspicions About Moussaoui, Agent Says
By NEIL A. LEWIS
Published: March 20, 2006
ALEXANDRIA, Va., March 20 — The F.B.I. agent who arrested and interrogated Zacarias Moussaoui just weeks before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, told a jury today that his efforts to confirm his strong suspicions that Mr. Moussaoui was involved in a terrorist airline hijacking plot were thwarted by senior bureau officials in Washington who acted out of negligence and a need to protect their careers.
Harry Samit, under intense cross-examination by Mr. Moussaoui's chief court-appointed lawyer, detailed his frustration over the days before the hijacking as he made numerous requests to look into what Mr. Moussaoui had been up to at the time of his arrest. Mr. Moussaoui was arrested on immigration violations in Minnesota, where he was learning to fly a jetliner.
"I accused the people in F.B.I. headquarters of criminal negligence" in an interview after Sept. 11, Mr. Samit acknowledged under questioning by Edward B. MacMahon Jr. He said that the senior agents in Washington "took a calculated risk not to advance the investigation" by refusing to seek search warrants for Mr. Moussaoui's belongings and computer. "The wager was a national tragedy," Mr. Samit testified.
Mr. Samit said that two senior agents declined to provide help in getting a search warrant, either through a special panel of judges that considers applications for foreign intelligence cases or through a normal application to any federal court for a criminal investigation.
As a field agent in Minnesota, he said he required help and approval from headquarters to continue his investigation. He acknowledged that he had written that Michael Maltbie, an agent in the F.B.I.'s radical fundamentalist unit, told him that applications for the special intelligence court warrants had proved troublesome for the bureau and seeking one "was just the kind of thing that would get F.B.I. agents in trouble." He wrote that Mr. Maltbie had told him that "he was not about to let that happen to him." During that period, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court, had complained about improper applications from the bureau.
Mr. Samit also acknowledged that he had written that David Frasca, a supervisor of the radical fundamentalist unit, had similarly blocked him from seeking a search warrant under the more common route in a criminal investigation. Some of the special court's complaints dealt with the idea that law-enforcement officials were sometimes using the lower standard required for warrants in intelligence investigations and then using the information they obtained in criminal cases.
Mr. Frasca, Mr. Samit explained, believed that once the Moussaoui investigation was opened as an intelligence investigation, it would arouse suspicion that agents had been trying to exploit the intelligence law to get information for an investigation they now believed was a criminal one.
(An F.B.I. spokesman, Bill Carter, said the agency did not comment on pending trials or litigation.)
The distinction between the two standards for obtaining warrants has since been eliminated following the Sept. 11 attacks.
The government is trying to prove to a jury that Mr. Moussaoui should be executed because he bears some responsibility for the deaths from Sept. 11. Prosecutors have argued that if Mr. Moussaoui had told Mr. Samit and other investigators what he knew about Al Qaeda plots to fly planes into buildings, the attacks might have been foiled.
Although Mr. Samit was a government witness who sought to bolster the government's case that he could have uncovered the plot had Mr. Moussaoui spoken to him truthfully, his responses to Mr. MacMahon today appeared to provide a lift for the defense. Mr. MacMahon sought to show that the problem was not with Mr. Moussaoui but with senior F.B.I. officials in Washington who would not budge no matter how hard Mr. Samit pressed them.
The F.B.I.'s handling of clues to the impending Sept. 11 attacks was sharply criticized in a report by the Justice Department's inspector general's office in 2004. Citing a memo from a Phoenix agent who had become suspicious of several students taking flying lessons in Arizona, the report said the agent's memo did not get the timely attention it deserved, not so much because of individual lapses within the F.B.I. but because of "critical systemic failings" that kept information from being effectively evaluated and shared.
The slow and incomplete attention given the memo from Phoenix was illustrative of a system "in which important information could easily 'fall through the cracks' and not be brought to the attention of the people who needed it, the inspector general's office concluded.
FBI Agent Slams Bosses at Moussaoui Trial
http://www.forbes.com/business/commerce/feeds/ap/2006/03/20/ap2608623.html
By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN , 03.20.2006, 06:36 PM
The FBI agent who arrested Zacarias Moussaoui in August 2001 testified Monday he spent almost four weeks trying to warn U.S. officials about the radical Islamic student pilot but "criminal negligence" by superiors in Washington thwarted a chance to stop the 9/11 attacks.
FBI agent Harry Samit of Minneapolis originally testified as a government witness, on March 9, but his daylong cross examination by defense attorney Edward MacMahon was the strongest moment so far for the court-appointed lawyers defending Moussaoui. The 37-year-old Frenchman of Moroccan descent is the only person charged in this country in connection with al-Qaida's Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
MacMahon displayed a communication addressed to Samit and FBI headquarters agent Mike Maltbie from a bureau agent in Paris relaying word from French intelligence that Moussaoui was "very dangerous," had been indoctrinated in radical Islamic Fundamentalism at London's Finnsbury Park mosque, was "completely devoted" to a variety of radical fundamentalism that Osama bin Laden espoused, and had been to Afghanistan.
Based on what he already knew, Samit suspected that meant Moussaoui had been to training camps there, although the communication did not say that.
The communication arrived Aug. 30, 2001. The Sept. 11 Commission reported that British intelligence told U.S. officials on Sept 13, 2001, that Moussaoui had attended an al-Qaida training camp in Afghanistan. "Had this information been available in late August 2001, the Moussaoui case would almost certainly have received intense, high-level attention," the commission concluded.
But Samit told MacMahon he couldn't persuade FBI headquarters or the Justice Department to take his fears seriously. No one from Washington called Samit to say this intelligence altered the picture the agent had been painting since Aug. 18 in a running battle with Maltbie and Maltbie's boss, David Frasca, chief of the radical fundamentalist unit at headquarters.
They fought over Samit's desire for a warrant to search Moussaoui's computer and belongings. Maltbie and Frasca said Samit had not established a link between Moussaoui and terrorists.
Samit testified that on Aug. 22 he had learned from the French that Moussaoui had recruited someone to go to Chechnya in 2000 to fight with Islamic radicals under Emir Ibn al-Khattab. He said a CIA official told him on Aug. 22 or 23 that al-Khattab had fought alongside bin Laden in the past. This, too, failed to sway Maltbie or Frasca.
Under questioning from MacMahon, Samit acknowledged that he had told the Justice Department inspector general that "obstructionism, criminal negligence and careerism" on the part of FBI headquarters officials had prevented him from getting a warrant that would have revealed more about Moussaoui's associates. He said that opposition blocked "a serious opportunity to stop the 9/11 attacks."
The FBI's actions between Moussaoui's arrest, in Minnesota on immigration violations on Aug. 16, 2001, and Sept. 11, 2001, are crucial to his trial because prosecutors allege that Moussaoui's lies prevented the FBI from discovering the identities of 9/11 hijackers and the Federal Aviation Administration from taking airport security steps.
But MacMahon made clear the Moussaoui's lies never fooled Samit. The agent sent a memo to FBI headquarters on Aug. 18 accusing Moussaoui of plotting international terrorism and air piracy over the United States, two of the six crimes he pleaded guilty to in 2005.
To obtain a death penalty, prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions led directly to the death of at least one person on 9/11.
Moussaoui pleaded guilty last April to conspiring with al-Qaida to fly planes into U.S. buildings. But he says he had nothing to do with 9/11 and was training to fly a 747 jetliner into the White House as part of a possible later attack.
Samit's complaints echoed those raised in 2002 by Coleen Rowley, the bureau's agent-lawyer in the Minneapolis office, who tried to help get a warrant. Rowley went public with her frustrations, was named a Time magazine person of the year for whistleblowing and is now running for Congress.
Samit revealed far more than Rowley of the details of the investigation.
MacMahon walked Samit through e-mails and letters the agent sent seeking help from the FBI's London, Paris and Oklahoma City offices, FBI headquarters files, the CIA's counterterrorism center, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, an intelligence agency not identified publicly by name in court (possibly the National Security Agency), and the FBI's Iran, Osama bin Laden, radical fundamentalist, and national security law units at headquarters.
Samit described useful information from French intelligence and the CIA before 9/11 but said he was not told that CIA Director George Tenet was briefed on the Moussaoui threat on Aug. 23 and never saw until after 9/11 a memo from an FBI agent in Phoenix about radical Islamists taking flight training there.
For each nugget of information, MacMahon asked Samit if Washington officials called to assess the implications. Time after time, Samit said no.
MacMahon introduced an Aug. 31 letter Samit drafted "to advise the FAA of a potential threat to security of commercial aircraft" from whomever Moussaoui was conspiring with.
But Maltbie barred him from sending it to FAA headquarters, saying he would handle that, Samit testified. The agent added that he did tell FAA officials in Minneapolis of his suspicions.
http://www.forbes.com/business/commerce/feeds/ap/2006/03/20/ap2608623.html
By MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN , 03.20.2006, 06:36 PM
The FBI agent who arrested Zacarias Moussaoui in August 2001 testified Monday he spent almost four weeks trying to warn U.S. officials about the radical Islamic student pilot but "criminal negligence" by superiors in Washington thwarted a chance to stop the 9/11 attacks.
FBI agent Harry Samit of Minneapolis originally testified as a government witness, on March 9, but his daylong cross examination by defense attorney Edward MacMahon was the strongest moment so far for the court-appointed lawyers defending Moussaoui. The 37-year-old Frenchman of Moroccan descent is the only person charged in this country in connection with al-Qaida's Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
MacMahon displayed a communication addressed to Samit and FBI headquarters agent Mike Maltbie from a bureau agent in Paris relaying word from French intelligence that Moussaoui was "very dangerous," had been indoctrinated in radical Islamic Fundamentalism at London's Finnsbury Park mosque, was "completely devoted" to a variety of radical fundamentalism that Osama bin Laden espoused, and had been to Afghanistan.
Based on what he already knew, Samit suspected that meant Moussaoui had been to training camps there, although the communication did not say that.
The communication arrived Aug. 30, 2001. The Sept. 11 Commission reported that British intelligence told U.S. officials on Sept 13, 2001, that Moussaoui had attended an al-Qaida training camp in Afghanistan. "Had this information been available in late August 2001, the Moussaoui case would almost certainly have received intense, high-level attention," the commission concluded.
But Samit told MacMahon he couldn't persuade FBI headquarters or the Justice Department to take his fears seriously. No one from Washington called Samit to say this intelligence altered the picture the agent had been painting since Aug. 18 in a running battle with Maltbie and Maltbie's boss, David Frasca, chief of the radical fundamentalist unit at headquarters.
They fought over Samit's desire for a warrant to search Moussaoui's computer and belongings. Maltbie and Frasca said Samit had not established a link between Moussaoui and terrorists.
Samit testified that on Aug. 22 he had learned from the French that Moussaoui had recruited someone to go to Chechnya in 2000 to fight with Islamic radicals under Emir Ibn al-Khattab. He said a CIA official told him on Aug. 22 or 23 that al-Khattab had fought alongside bin Laden in the past. This, too, failed to sway Maltbie or Frasca.
Under questioning from MacMahon, Samit acknowledged that he had told the Justice Department inspector general that "obstructionism, criminal negligence and careerism" on the part of FBI headquarters officials had prevented him from getting a warrant that would have revealed more about Moussaoui's associates. He said that opposition blocked "a serious opportunity to stop the 9/11 attacks."
The FBI's actions between Moussaoui's arrest, in Minnesota on immigration violations on Aug. 16, 2001, and Sept. 11, 2001, are crucial to his trial because prosecutors allege that Moussaoui's lies prevented the FBI from discovering the identities of 9/11 hijackers and the Federal Aviation Administration from taking airport security steps.
But MacMahon made clear the Moussaoui's lies never fooled Samit. The agent sent a memo to FBI headquarters on Aug. 18 accusing Moussaoui of plotting international terrorism and air piracy over the United States, two of the six crimes he pleaded guilty to in 2005.
To obtain a death penalty, prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions led directly to the death of at least one person on 9/11.
Moussaoui pleaded guilty last April to conspiring with al-Qaida to fly planes into U.S. buildings. But he says he had nothing to do with 9/11 and was training to fly a 747 jetliner into the White House as part of a possible later attack.
Samit's complaints echoed those raised in 2002 by Coleen Rowley, the bureau's agent-lawyer in the Minneapolis office, who tried to help get a warrant. Rowley went public with her frustrations, was named a Time magazine person of the year for whistleblowing and is now running for Congress.
Samit revealed far more than Rowley of the details of the investigation.
MacMahon walked Samit through e-mails and letters the agent sent seeking help from the FBI's London, Paris and Oklahoma City offices, FBI headquarters files, the CIA's counterterrorism center, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, an intelligence agency not identified publicly by name in court (possibly the National Security Agency), and the FBI's Iran, Osama bin Laden, radical fundamentalist, and national security law units at headquarters.
Samit described useful information from French intelligence and the CIA before 9/11 but said he was not told that CIA Director George Tenet was briefed on the Moussaoui threat on Aug. 23 and never saw until after 9/11 a memo from an FBI agent in Phoenix about radical Islamists taking flight training there.
For each nugget of information, MacMahon asked Samit if Washington officials called to assess the implications. Time after time, Samit said no.
MacMahon introduced an Aug. 31 letter Samit drafted "to advise the FAA of a potential threat to security of commercial aircraft" from whomever Moussaoui was conspiring with.
But Maltbie barred him from sending it to FAA headquarters, saying he would handle that, Samit testified. The agent added that he did tell FAA officials in Minneapolis of his suspicions.
P
Partridge
Guest
[font=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Roommate Told FBI of Moussaoui Interests
AP[/font]
A former roommate of confessed al-Qaida terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui told FBI agents that Moussaoui had expressed an interest in holy war and believed Muslims were within their rights to kill infidels, according to court testimony.
A videotaped deposition of Hussein al-Attas, who roomed with Moussaoui in 2001 in Oklahoma and was with Moussaoui in Minnesota in August 2001 when he was arrested by federal agents, was to be played for the jury Tuesday when Moussaoui's death-penalty trial resumes.
The jury got a preview of some of al-Attas' statements through the testimony Monday of Harry Samit, the FBI agent who arrested Moussaoui in August 2001 and also interrogated al-Attas.
Samit testified that his belief that Moussaoui was a radical Islamic extremist bent on terrorism was based in part on al-Attas' statements.
[font=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Al-Attas told Samit that Moussaoui often talked about jihad, or holy war, and that Moussaoui once pointed out to him a television report about Osama bin Laden, with Moussaoui noting that bin Laden was an important person.
Samit testified that he worked obsessively after Moussaoui's Aug. 16, 2001, arrest to convince FBI headquarters that Moussaoui warranted a full-scale investigation and that a search warrant should be obtained for his belongings.
The agent obtained a search warrant only after the Sept. 11 attacks, and attributed the FBI's failure to launch a timely investigation to "criminal negligence" and careerism by certain agents in FBI headquarters. The bureau's failures thwarted an opportunity to prevent the attacks, he said.
Moussaoui is the only person charged in this country in connection with the Sept. 11 attacks.
[font=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]He has already pleaded guilty to conspiring with al-Qaida to hijack aircraft and commit other crimes. But he denies a specific role in 9/11. His sentencing trial will determine his punishment: death or life in prison.
The FBI's actions between Moussaoui's arrest and Sept. 11 are crucial to the trial because prosecutors allege that Moussaoui's lies to Samit prevented the FBI from thwarting or at least minimizing the Sept. 11 attacks. Prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions caused the death of at least one person on 9/11 to obtain a death penalty.
The defense argues that nothing Moussaoui said after his arrest would have made any difference to the FBI because its bureaucratic intransigence rendered it incapable of reacting swiftly to Moussaoui's arrest under any circumstances.
[/font]
[/font]
AP[/font]
A former roommate of confessed al-Qaida terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui told FBI agents that Moussaoui had expressed an interest in holy war and believed Muslims were within their rights to kill infidels, according to court testimony.
A videotaped deposition of Hussein al-Attas, who roomed with Moussaoui in 2001 in Oklahoma and was with Moussaoui in Minnesota in August 2001 when he was arrested by federal agents, was to be played for the jury Tuesday when Moussaoui's death-penalty trial resumes.
The jury got a preview of some of al-Attas' statements through the testimony Monday of Harry Samit, the FBI agent who arrested Moussaoui in August 2001 and also interrogated al-Attas.
Samit testified that his belief that Moussaoui was a radical Islamic extremist bent on terrorism was based in part on al-Attas' statements.
[font=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Al-Attas told Samit that Moussaoui often talked about jihad, or holy war, and that Moussaoui once pointed out to him a television report about Osama bin Laden, with Moussaoui noting that bin Laden was an important person.
Samit testified that he worked obsessively after Moussaoui's Aug. 16, 2001, arrest to convince FBI headquarters that Moussaoui warranted a full-scale investigation and that a search warrant should be obtained for his belongings.
The agent obtained a search warrant only after the Sept. 11 attacks, and attributed the FBI's failure to launch a timely investigation to "criminal negligence" and careerism by certain agents in FBI headquarters. The bureau's failures thwarted an opportunity to prevent the attacks, he said.
Moussaoui is the only person charged in this country in connection with the Sept. 11 attacks.
[font=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]He has already pleaded guilty to conspiring with al-Qaida to hijack aircraft and commit other crimes. But he denies a specific role in 9/11. His sentencing trial will determine his punishment: death or life in prison.
The FBI's actions between Moussaoui's arrest and Sept. 11 are crucial to the trial because prosecutors allege that Moussaoui's lies to Samit prevented the FBI from thwarting or at least minimizing the Sept. 11 attacks. Prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions caused the death of at least one person on 9/11 to obtain a death penalty.
The defense argues that nothing Moussaoui said after his arrest would have made any difference to the FBI because its bureaucratic intransigence rendered it incapable of reacting swiftly to Moussaoui's arrest under any circumstances.
[/font]
[/font]
P
Partridge
Guest
Supervisor: I Never Read Moussaoui Memo
AP
A terrorism supervisor in FBI headquarters dismissed a field agent's concerns about confessed al-Qaida member Zacarias Moussaoui in the weeks before Sept. 11, 2001, as "hunches and suppositions" during testimony at Moussaoui's death-penalty trial.
The supervisor, Michael Rolince, testified Tuesday that he had not even read an Aug. 18, 2001, memo written by Minneapolis agent Harry Samit, who arrested Moussaoui and was convinced from the outset that Moussaoui was a terrorist with plans to hijack aircraft.
Rolince, who headed the FBI's International Terrorism Operations section, said he was briefed on Moussaoui only twice by a subordinate in hallway conversations lasting less than a minute.
Rolince concluded that the bureau had a long way to go in building a case against Moussaoui, even though Samit had laid out in a nearly 30-page memo his reasons for believing that the bureau had built a sufficient case to launch an all-out investigation and obtain a search warrant for Moussaoui's possessions.
"What Agent Samit's hunches and suppositions were is one thing," Rolince said. "What we knew was clearly something else."
Samit's memo proved prescient. He correctly predicted two of the six specific charges to which Moussaoui pleaded guilty: plotting international terrorism and air piracy.
Moussaoui is the only person in this country charged in connection with the Sept. 11 attacks. He pleaded guilty to conspiring with al-Qaida to hijack aircraft and other crimes, but he denies any role in Sept. 11. He says he was preparing for a possible future attack on the White House.
The sentencing trial now under way will determine Moussaoui's punishment: death or life in prison.
The FBI's actions in the time between Moussaoui's Aug. 16, 2001, arrest on immigration violations and Sept. 11, 2001, are key issues at Moussaoui's death-penalty trial. Prosecutors allege that if Moussaoui had revealed his plans for a terrorist attack, the FBI could have thwarted or at least minimized the attacks. To obtain a death penalty, prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions caused the death of at least one person on Sept. 11.
The defense argues that nothing Moussaoui said after his arrest would have made any difference to the FBI because its bureaucratic intransigence rendered it incapable of reacting swiftly to Moussaoui's arrest under any circumstances.
U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema limited the scope of Rolince's testimony after the defense objected that he was trying to describe what the FBI would have done if it had known about Moussaoui's terrorist ties.
The defense argued that speculative testimony based on a hypothetical confession by Moussaoui unfairly implied that Moussaoui had some obligation to confess.
Brinkema allowed some limited hypothetical questioning but advised the jury: "Juries cannot decide cases on speculation. ... Nobody knows what would have happened."
AP
A terrorism supervisor in FBI headquarters dismissed a field agent's concerns about confessed al-Qaida member Zacarias Moussaoui in the weeks before Sept. 11, 2001, as "hunches and suppositions" during testimony at Moussaoui's death-penalty trial.
The supervisor, Michael Rolince, testified Tuesday that he had not even read an Aug. 18, 2001, memo written by Minneapolis agent Harry Samit, who arrested Moussaoui and was convinced from the outset that Moussaoui was a terrorist with plans to hijack aircraft.
Rolince, who headed the FBI's International Terrorism Operations section, said he was briefed on Moussaoui only twice by a subordinate in hallway conversations lasting less than a minute.
Rolince concluded that the bureau had a long way to go in building a case against Moussaoui, even though Samit had laid out in a nearly 30-page memo his reasons for believing that the bureau had built a sufficient case to launch an all-out investigation and obtain a search warrant for Moussaoui's possessions.
"What Agent Samit's hunches and suppositions were is one thing," Rolince said. "What we knew was clearly something else."
Samit's memo proved prescient. He correctly predicted two of the six specific charges to which Moussaoui pleaded guilty: plotting international terrorism and air piracy.
Moussaoui is the only person in this country charged in connection with the Sept. 11 attacks. He pleaded guilty to conspiring with al-Qaida to hijack aircraft and other crimes, but he denies any role in Sept. 11. He says he was preparing for a possible future attack on the White House.
The sentencing trial now under way will determine Moussaoui's punishment: death or life in prison.
The FBI's actions in the time between Moussaoui's Aug. 16, 2001, arrest on immigration violations and Sept. 11, 2001, are key issues at Moussaoui's death-penalty trial. Prosecutors allege that if Moussaoui had revealed his plans for a terrorist attack, the FBI could have thwarted or at least minimized the attacks. To obtain a death penalty, prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions caused the death of at least one person on Sept. 11.
The defense argues that nothing Moussaoui said after his arrest would have made any difference to the FBI because its bureaucratic intransigence rendered it incapable of reacting swiftly to Moussaoui's arrest under any circumstances.
U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema limited the scope of Rolince's testimony after the defense objected that he was trying to describe what the FBI would have done if it had known about Moussaoui's terrorist ties.
The defense argued that speculative testimony based on a hypothetical confession by Moussaoui unfairly implied that Moussaoui had some obligation to confess.
Brinkema allowed some limited hypothetical questioning but advised the jury: "Juries cannot decide cases on speculation. ... Nobody knows what would have happened."
Witness Lists FAA Measures Available for a Pre-9/11 Tip
An agency official is the first to give aviation testimony after a federal attorney nearly derailed the sentencing trial of Zacarias Moussaoui.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-moussa23mar23,1,29052.story?coll=la-headlines-nation
(Gold9472: Pretty one-sided testimony wouldn't you say? What were the "tainted" witnesses going to testify about? That air traffic controller tapes were destroyed? That the FAA received multiple warnings prior to 9/11? This trial is a sham.)
By Richard A. Serrano, Times Staff Writer
March 23, 2006
ALEXANDRIA, Va. — A week after their case nearly imploded amid allegations of witness tampering, federal prosecutors began introducing aviation testimony Wednesday in Zacarias Moussaoui's sentencing trial, hoping to prove that had he cooperated, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks could have been prevented.
Their first witness was Robert Cammaroto, chief of the Federal Aviation Administration's commercial airports policy division at the time of the attacks. He was allowed to testify on a limited basis after revelations last week that a Transportation Security Administration lawyer had improperly coached other federal aviation witnesses on their testimony.
Cammaroto listed security measures that could have been implemented had Moussaoui cooperated with the FBI after he was arrested in Minnesota for visa violations on Aug. 16, 2001.
For two hours, prosecutors methodically walked Cammaroto through his testimony. He told the court how the government could have responded to the Sept. 11 threat, and he offered new details on how the Federal Aviation Administration beefed up security when, in 1995, it was learned that Muslim extremists were plotting to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific Ocean.
Cammaroto spoke with authority and the experience of 25 years in the government security field — starting as an air traffic controller, moving on to become a federal air marshal and rising to a post as one of the FAA's top law enforcement officials.
Asked by Assistant U.S. Atty. David J. Novak how swiftly airport security officials would have reacted had Moussaoui revealed that the Sept. 11 hijackers planned to smuggle small knives aboard planes and then commandeer the cockpits, Cammaroto said:
"It could have been done fairly quickly. In a matter of hours."
But under cross-examination by defense lawyer Gerald T. Zerkin, Cammaroto conceded that in the late summer of 2001, the approach to airport security was far more relaxed than it is today.
Few people envisioned planes being hijacked on suicide missions, he said, and airport gate screening operations were less stringent. Passengers often were permitted to carry aboard such items as folding knives, bottles, screwdrivers and knitting needles.
Indeed, shown a security video of some of the Sept. 11 hijackers easily passing through checkpoints at Washington Dulles International Airport that morning, Cammaroto noted that only seven of the 19 had even been sent to a secondary screening, and none had been denied a seat.
"It seemed an act of desperation to blow yourself up" back then, Cammaroto said.
In the past, he said, hijackings mainly involved planes' diversion to Cuba or ransom demands. "We'd never had an incident where the bomber rode the bomb," he said.
The aviation testimony and evidence are central to the government's argument for executing Moussaoui. Prosecutors seek to convince the jury that Moussaoui knew enough about the Sept. 11 plot to help stop it.
But Moussaoui lied to the FBI and then refused to cooperate, sharply dividing the FBI about what to do with him.
The FBI never sought search warrants to open his belongings and learn more about why he was training on jumbo jet simulators in Minnesota.
The defense maintains that Moussaoui, who pleaded guilty to being a Sept. 11 conspirator last April, was a lone operator and never had any direct role or knowledge that four planes were going to be boarded that day, three of which reached targets in New York and Virginia.
With Moussaoui's survival at stake, the government's case nearly fell apart last week when it was discovered that TSA senior attorney Carla J. Martin had improperly influenced seven TSA and FAA witnesses for the government. U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema sharply limited the government's aviation testimony and evidence to just one or two witnesses, making Cammaroto's testimony all the more crucial.
The judge has yet to call Martin into the courtroom to explain her conduct.
Cammaroto described half a dozen security steps the FAA could have taken to try to head off the attacks. He said more officers could have been posted immediately at airport checkpoints, and small knives and other potential weapons could have been confiscated at the gates.
He said planes could have been searched before boarding to make sure previous passengers had not hidden bombs or weapons in overhead baggage bins or in lavatories.
Cammaroto said flight crews could have been warned to keep cockpit doors secure, and new no-fly lists could have been posted to stop the 19 hijackers from boarding planes.
"We could have done much of this in the course of a couple of hours," he said.
He drew a parallel with the "Bojinka" plot, uncovered in 1995 in Manila, in which radical Islamists planned to hide liquid bombs on 12 U.S. planes and detonate them over the Pacific.
Just as they could have done to thwart the Sept. 11 conspiracy, Cammaroto said, officials alerted the airlines about the Bojinka conspiracy, stopped passengers from carrying open drink containers aboard, and sent bomb-sniffing dogs to the Philippines. More thorough pat-downs and other passenger searches also were initiated.
"As our intelligence improved, we were able to refine and refine and refine until we got closer to the mark," he said.
In the end, there were no attacks.
An agency official is the first to give aviation testimony after a federal attorney nearly derailed the sentencing trial of Zacarias Moussaoui.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-moussa23mar23,1,29052.story?coll=la-headlines-nation
(Gold9472: Pretty one-sided testimony wouldn't you say? What were the "tainted" witnesses going to testify about? That air traffic controller tapes were destroyed? That the FAA received multiple warnings prior to 9/11? This trial is a sham.)
By Richard A. Serrano, Times Staff Writer
March 23, 2006
ALEXANDRIA, Va. — A week after their case nearly imploded amid allegations of witness tampering, federal prosecutors began introducing aviation testimony Wednesday in Zacarias Moussaoui's sentencing trial, hoping to prove that had he cooperated, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks could have been prevented.
Their first witness was Robert Cammaroto, chief of the Federal Aviation Administration's commercial airports policy division at the time of the attacks. He was allowed to testify on a limited basis after revelations last week that a Transportation Security Administration lawyer had improperly coached other federal aviation witnesses on their testimony.
Cammaroto listed security measures that could have been implemented had Moussaoui cooperated with the FBI after he was arrested in Minnesota for visa violations on Aug. 16, 2001.
For two hours, prosecutors methodically walked Cammaroto through his testimony. He told the court how the government could have responded to the Sept. 11 threat, and he offered new details on how the Federal Aviation Administration beefed up security when, in 1995, it was learned that Muslim extremists were plotting to blow up a dozen U.S. airliners over the Pacific Ocean.
Cammaroto spoke with authority and the experience of 25 years in the government security field — starting as an air traffic controller, moving on to become a federal air marshal and rising to a post as one of the FAA's top law enforcement officials.
Asked by Assistant U.S. Atty. David J. Novak how swiftly airport security officials would have reacted had Moussaoui revealed that the Sept. 11 hijackers planned to smuggle small knives aboard planes and then commandeer the cockpits, Cammaroto said:
"It could have been done fairly quickly. In a matter of hours."
But under cross-examination by defense lawyer Gerald T. Zerkin, Cammaroto conceded that in the late summer of 2001, the approach to airport security was far more relaxed than it is today.
Few people envisioned planes being hijacked on suicide missions, he said, and airport gate screening operations were less stringent. Passengers often were permitted to carry aboard such items as folding knives, bottles, screwdrivers and knitting needles.
Indeed, shown a security video of some of the Sept. 11 hijackers easily passing through checkpoints at Washington Dulles International Airport that morning, Cammaroto noted that only seven of the 19 had even been sent to a secondary screening, and none had been denied a seat.
"It seemed an act of desperation to blow yourself up" back then, Cammaroto said.
In the past, he said, hijackings mainly involved planes' diversion to Cuba or ransom demands. "We'd never had an incident where the bomber rode the bomb," he said.
The aviation testimony and evidence are central to the government's argument for executing Moussaoui. Prosecutors seek to convince the jury that Moussaoui knew enough about the Sept. 11 plot to help stop it.
But Moussaoui lied to the FBI and then refused to cooperate, sharply dividing the FBI about what to do with him.
The FBI never sought search warrants to open his belongings and learn more about why he was training on jumbo jet simulators in Minnesota.
The defense maintains that Moussaoui, who pleaded guilty to being a Sept. 11 conspirator last April, was a lone operator and never had any direct role or knowledge that four planes were going to be boarded that day, three of which reached targets in New York and Virginia.
With Moussaoui's survival at stake, the government's case nearly fell apart last week when it was discovered that TSA senior attorney Carla J. Martin had improperly influenced seven TSA and FAA witnesses for the government. U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema sharply limited the government's aviation testimony and evidence to just one or two witnesses, making Cammaroto's testimony all the more crucial.
The judge has yet to call Martin into the courtroom to explain her conduct.
Cammaroto described half a dozen security steps the FAA could have taken to try to head off the attacks. He said more officers could have been posted immediately at airport checkpoints, and small knives and other potential weapons could have been confiscated at the gates.
He said planes could have been searched before boarding to make sure previous passengers had not hidden bombs or weapons in overhead baggage bins or in lavatories.
Cammaroto said flight crews could have been warned to keep cockpit doors secure, and new no-fly lists could have been posted to stop the 19 hijackers from boarding planes.
"We could have done much of this in the course of a couple of hours," he said.
He drew a parallel with the "Bojinka" plot, uncovered in 1995 in Manila, in which radical Islamists planned to hide liquid bombs on 12 U.S. planes and detonate them over the Pacific.
Just as they could have done to thwart the Sept. 11 conspiracy, Cammaroto said, officials alerted the airlines about the Bojinka conspiracy, stopped passengers from carrying open drink containers aboard, and sent bomb-sniffing dogs to the Philippines. More thorough pat-downs and other passenger searches also were initiated.
"As our intelligence improved, we were able to refine and refine and refine until we got closer to the mark," he said.
In the end, there were no attacks.
P
Partridge
Guest
Agent says Moussaoui could have helped FBI
AP
The confession given by al-Qaida terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui last year could have helped unravel the Sept. 11, 2001, plot if investigators had heard it when he was arrested in the month before the attacks, according to testimony Thursday by a former FBI agent.
In particular, Moussaoui's admission that he received more than $14,000 in wire transfers from a man using the name of Ahad Sabet could have allowed the FBI to backtrack through Western Union, cell phone and calling-card records to identify two of the Sept. 11 hijackers, former agent Aaron Zebley said in Moussaoui's death penalty trial.
Rulings by U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema prevent Zebley from offering explicit speculation about what the FBI could have accomplished had it known this information when Moussaoui was arrested in August 2001. But the clear implication is that Moussaoui's refusal to give a timely confession thwarted some of the FBI's best opportunities to prevent or at least minimize the Sept. 11 attacks.
As it was, certain details came out when Moussaoui pleaded guilty in federal court in April.
Moussaoui is the only person in this country charged in the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people when al-Qaida flew hijacked planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a Pennsylvania field.
He pleaded guilty in April to conspiring with al-Qaida to hijack aircraft and commit other crimes, but he denies a specific role in 9/11. The sentencing trial now under way will determine whether he is executed or imprisoned for life, the jury's only choices.
When Moussaoui pleaded guilty, he confessed his al-Qaida membership and divulged numerous details of his terrorist plans, including his flight training, his receipt of al-Qaida money from an individual in Germany, and al-Qaida's general plans to hijack aircraft and crash them into prominent U.S. targets.
Zebley testified that the details of Moussaoui's confession, had they been known before 9/11, could have provided multiple leads for the FBI, including tracking al-Qaida's money trail and assigning more agents to the case.
Earlier in the trial, the FBI agent who arrested Moussaoui said he spent four weeks warning his bosses about the radical Islamic student pilot. Harry Samit said bureaucratic resistance to his efforts to subject Moussaoui to a thorough investigation blocked "a serious opportunity to stop the 9/11 attacks."
Moussaoui was arrested Aug. 16, 2001, on immigration violations after he aroused suspicion at a Minnesota flight school. He lied to agents and insisted his flight training was for personal enjoyment.
To obtain the death penalty, prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions caused the death of at least one person on 9/11. They argue that he could have prevented or at least minimized the attacks if he had confessed and alerted federal agents to the imminent threat posed by al-Qaida. [Partridge: Perhaps someone a bit more knowledgable can help me out here but... I recall seeing/reading somewhere that some NY official - Guliani maybe - said something to the effect that "we knew [one of the towers] was going to collapse" - yet they failed to tell the firemen in the building. Shouldn't that person also be facing the death penalty for causing 'at least one death'?]
The defense argues that nothing Moussaoui said after his arrest would have made any difference to the FBI because its bureaucratic intransigence rendered it incapable of reacting swiftly to Moussaoui's arrest under any circumstances.
Prosecutors argue that Moussaoui was obliged to tell the truth once he decided to talk to federal agents, and that the jury can consider what might have happened if Moussaoui had confessed.
Meanwhile, the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Brinkema to make public copies of certain documents, videos and photographs the day after they are introduced as evidence. Brinkema had been withholding them until the trial's end. The court acted in a lawsuit brought by nine news and reporters' organizations, including The Associated Press.
AP
The confession given by al-Qaida terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui last year could have helped unravel the Sept. 11, 2001, plot if investigators had heard it when he was arrested in the month before the attacks, according to testimony Thursday by a former FBI agent.
In particular, Moussaoui's admission that he received more than $14,000 in wire transfers from a man using the name of Ahad Sabet could have allowed the FBI to backtrack through Western Union, cell phone and calling-card records to identify two of the Sept. 11 hijackers, former agent Aaron Zebley said in Moussaoui's death penalty trial.
Rulings by U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema prevent Zebley from offering explicit speculation about what the FBI could have accomplished had it known this information when Moussaoui was arrested in August 2001. But the clear implication is that Moussaoui's refusal to give a timely confession thwarted some of the FBI's best opportunities to prevent or at least minimize the Sept. 11 attacks.
As it was, certain details came out when Moussaoui pleaded guilty in federal court in April.
Moussaoui is the only person in this country charged in the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people when al-Qaida flew hijacked planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a Pennsylvania field.
He pleaded guilty in April to conspiring with al-Qaida to hijack aircraft and commit other crimes, but he denies a specific role in 9/11. The sentencing trial now under way will determine whether he is executed or imprisoned for life, the jury's only choices.
When Moussaoui pleaded guilty, he confessed his al-Qaida membership and divulged numerous details of his terrorist plans, including his flight training, his receipt of al-Qaida money from an individual in Germany, and al-Qaida's general plans to hijack aircraft and crash them into prominent U.S. targets.
Zebley testified that the details of Moussaoui's confession, had they been known before 9/11, could have provided multiple leads for the FBI, including tracking al-Qaida's money trail and assigning more agents to the case.
Earlier in the trial, the FBI agent who arrested Moussaoui said he spent four weeks warning his bosses about the radical Islamic student pilot. Harry Samit said bureaucratic resistance to his efforts to subject Moussaoui to a thorough investigation blocked "a serious opportunity to stop the 9/11 attacks."
Moussaoui was arrested Aug. 16, 2001, on immigration violations after he aroused suspicion at a Minnesota flight school. He lied to agents and insisted his flight training was for personal enjoyment.
To obtain the death penalty, prosecutors must prove that Moussaoui's actions caused the death of at least one person on 9/11. They argue that he could have prevented or at least minimized the attacks if he had confessed and alerted federal agents to the imminent threat posed by al-Qaida. [Partridge: Perhaps someone a bit more knowledgable can help me out here but... I recall seeing/reading somewhere that some NY official - Guliani maybe - said something to the effect that "we knew [one of the towers] was going to collapse" - yet they failed to tell the firemen in the building. Shouldn't that person also be facing the death penalty for causing 'at least one death'?]
The defense argues that nothing Moussaoui said after his arrest would have made any difference to the FBI because its bureaucratic intransigence rendered it incapable of reacting swiftly to Moussaoui's arrest under any circumstances.
Prosecutors argue that Moussaoui was obliged to tell the truth once he decided to talk to federal agents, and that the jury can consider what might have happened if Moussaoui had confessed.
Meanwhile, the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Brinkema to make public copies of certain documents, videos and photographs the day after they are introduced as evidence. Brinkema had been withholding them until the trial's end. The court acted in a lawsuit brought by nine news and reporters' organizations, including The Associated Press.
P
Partridge
Guest
Meanwhile, the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Brinkema to make public copies of certain documents, videos and photographs the day after they are introduced as evidence. Brinkema had been withholding them until the trial's end. The court acted in a lawsuit brought by nine news and reporters' organizations, including The Associated Press.
The Pentagon videos?!?!?
The Pentagon videos?!?!?
Families' Hope For Answers At 9/11 Trial Is Unfulfilled
With New Information Scant, Frustration and Pain Mingle
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/24/AR2006032401922.html
By Timothy Dwyer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, March 25, 2006; Page A08
Eleni Kousoulis carries a glossy photograph of her sister, Danielle, who was killed at the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001. She brought it to the seventh-floor courtroom of U.S. District Court in Alexandria this week when she and her mother, Zoe, made the trip from their home in Merion, Pa.
They had watched some of the death penalty trial of Zacarias Moussaoui on closed-circuit television in the courthouse in Philadelphia -- where only a few people have come each day -- but wanted to see Moussaoui in person and feel what it was like to sit a few feet away from him.
"It was emotional at times, especially when you see him smiling and laughing," Kousoulis said.
Moussaoui has pleaded guilty to conspiring with al-Qaeda in the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, and the government is seeking his execution.
The prosecution rested its case Thursday. For the families that have been watching the trial or keeping track of it, the process has been painful, frustrating and, sometimes, unsatisfying. What many of them were looking for, besides justice, was information about the day their loved ones were killed or injured and what the government could have done to prevent the attacks.
"There was one young lady I was talking to in court one day, and she was saying that the government is on trial as much as Moussaoui," said Abraham Scott of Arlington, a regular spectator whose wife, Janis, died in the plane that crashed into the Pentagon. "And in a sense she was right. They are both on trial."
Family members interviewed yesterday said they thought that prosecutors had a difficult case to prove -- that the Sept. 11 attacks could have been prevented had Moussaoui not lied when he was arrested by the FBI in August 2001. Some were angry at Carla J. Martin, a lawyer with the Transportation Security Administration whose coaching of witnesses prompted key testimony from Federal Aviation Administration employees to be disallowed.
"I'm not satisfied," said Rosemary Dillard of Alexandria, whose husband, Eddie, was also on the plane that hit the Pentagon. "I was definitely expecting more information to come out at the trial. It is still not a clear picture. It is very blurred for me."
Others gave the prosecutors credit.
"I think they did the best they could with what they had," said Kousoulis, a lawyer with the federal public defender's office in Delaware.
She said that she welcomed Moussaoui's promise to testify; he could take the stand as early as Monday. "I would love it," she said. "I think he would be stupid to testify, but I would love him to get on the witness stand, love to hear what he had to say to see if he could give us more information than what we have now."
Congress and U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema designated federal courthouses in Boston, Newark, Philadelphia and New York and on Long Island, N.Y., where families can watch the trial. In addition, a courtroom in Alexandria has been set aside for viewing the broadcast. Only family members with special passes are allowed in, so it is difficult to gauge the turnout.
Zoe Kousoulis said that in Philadelphia, attendance had ranged from a half-dozen people to one or two.
The half-dozen people who gather daily to watch the trial in U.S. District Court in Boston have come up with a name for themselves.
"The Usual Suspects," said Blake Allison of Hanover, N.H., whose wife, Anna Allison, was killed on American Airlines Flight 11, which struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center.
Allison said he thought the prosecution was hurt by the testimony of FBI agent Harry Samit, who said that he sent reports to FBI headquarters with more than 70 references to Moussaoui as a terrorist and that the FBI declined his requests to open a criminal investigation or get a search warrant.
"I have felt from the outset that Moussaoui didn't deserve the death penalty for his role in this because I did have doubts about his relationship to the events of Sept. 11," Allison said. "And the prosecutors have done nothing to alter my opinion. . . . I was hoping that this would bring to light information that would put the events into a more clear light, and I am very disappointed that that has not happened."
He said that the elimination of some of the FAA testimony gutted half of the prosecution's case and prevented the families from hearing what the FAA would have done, or did, to prevent the attacks.
Cathie Ong-Herrera, whose sister, Betty Ong, was a flight attendant on Flight 11, traveled from California to Alexandria during the first week of testimony and has been following it closely in news reports.
She said Martin damaged "the prosecution case and kept it from going the way that it was supposed to go. For the families, I think I have to say that we were hoping to learn more than we already know, and she hurt the case as far as helping us get more information."
Sheila Langone, whose two sons -- a firefighter and a police officer -- were killed at the World Trade Center, said she feared that Martin's misstep will spare Moussaoui's life.
"I am of the opinion right now that he will not get the death penalty," she said. "I think that little screw-up kind of messed things up. I would hope that it wouldn't affect it, but I think it will."
She said the trial proved to her that "there is an awful lot in our government that needs to be straightened out. The FBI doesn't talk to the CIA, and the CIA doesn't talk to anyone else."
With New Information Scant, Frustration and Pain Mingle
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/24/AR2006032401922.html
By Timothy Dwyer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, March 25, 2006; Page A08
Eleni Kousoulis carries a glossy photograph of her sister, Danielle, who was killed at the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001. She brought it to the seventh-floor courtroom of U.S. District Court in Alexandria this week when she and her mother, Zoe, made the trip from their home in Merion, Pa.
They had watched some of the death penalty trial of Zacarias Moussaoui on closed-circuit television in the courthouse in Philadelphia -- where only a few people have come each day -- but wanted to see Moussaoui in person and feel what it was like to sit a few feet away from him.
"It was emotional at times, especially when you see him smiling and laughing," Kousoulis said.
Moussaoui has pleaded guilty to conspiring with al-Qaeda in the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, and the government is seeking his execution.
The prosecution rested its case Thursday. For the families that have been watching the trial or keeping track of it, the process has been painful, frustrating and, sometimes, unsatisfying. What many of them were looking for, besides justice, was information about the day their loved ones were killed or injured and what the government could have done to prevent the attacks.
"There was one young lady I was talking to in court one day, and she was saying that the government is on trial as much as Moussaoui," said Abraham Scott of Arlington, a regular spectator whose wife, Janis, died in the plane that crashed into the Pentagon. "And in a sense she was right. They are both on trial."
Family members interviewed yesterday said they thought that prosecutors had a difficult case to prove -- that the Sept. 11 attacks could have been prevented had Moussaoui not lied when he was arrested by the FBI in August 2001. Some were angry at Carla J. Martin, a lawyer with the Transportation Security Administration whose coaching of witnesses prompted key testimony from Federal Aviation Administration employees to be disallowed.
"I'm not satisfied," said Rosemary Dillard of Alexandria, whose husband, Eddie, was also on the plane that hit the Pentagon. "I was definitely expecting more information to come out at the trial. It is still not a clear picture. It is very blurred for me."
Others gave the prosecutors credit.
"I think they did the best they could with what they had," said Kousoulis, a lawyer with the federal public defender's office in Delaware.
She said that she welcomed Moussaoui's promise to testify; he could take the stand as early as Monday. "I would love it," she said. "I think he would be stupid to testify, but I would love him to get on the witness stand, love to hear what he had to say to see if he could give us more information than what we have now."
Congress and U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema designated federal courthouses in Boston, Newark, Philadelphia and New York and on Long Island, N.Y., where families can watch the trial. In addition, a courtroom in Alexandria has been set aside for viewing the broadcast. Only family members with special passes are allowed in, so it is difficult to gauge the turnout.
Zoe Kousoulis said that in Philadelphia, attendance had ranged from a half-dozen people to one or two.
The half-dozen people who gather daily to watch the trial in U.S. District Court in Boston have come up with a name for themselves.
"The Usual Suspects," said Blake Allison of Hanover, N.H., whose wife, Anna Allison, was killed on American Airlines Flight 11, which struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center.
Allison said he thought the prosecution was hurt by the testimony of FBI agent Harry Samit, who said that he sent reports to FBI headquarters with more than 70 references to Moussaoui as a terrorist and that the FBI declined his requests to open a criminal investigation or get a search warrant.
"I have felt from the outset that Moussaoui didn't deserve the death penalty for his role in this because I did have doubts about his relationship to the events of Sept. 11," Allison said. "And the prosecutors have done nothing to alter my opinion. . . . I was hoping that this would bring to light information that would put the events into a more clear light, and I am very disappointed that that has not happened."
He said that the elimination of some of the FAA testimony gutted half of the prosecution's case and prevented the families from hearing what the FAA would have done, or did, to prevent the attacks.
Cathie Ong-Herrera, whose sister, Betty Ong, was a flight attendant on Flight 11, traveled from California to Alexandria during the first week of testimony and has been following it closely in news reports.
She said Martin damaged "the prosecution case and kept it from going the way that it was supposed to go. For the families, I think I have to say that we were hoping to learn more than we already know, and she hurt the case as far as helping us get more information."
Sheila Langone, whose two sons -- a firefighter and a police officer -- were killed at the World Trade Center, said she feared that Martin's misstep will spare Moussaoui's life.
"I am of the opinion right now that he will not get the death penalty," she said. "I think that little screw-up kind of messed things up. I would hope that it wouldn't affect it, but I think it will."
She said the trial proved to her that "there is an awful lot in our government that needs to be straightened out. The FBI doesn't talk to the CIA, and the CIA doesn't talk to anyone else."