Late August 2001 (C)
A Telegraph article later claims that Iraq leader Saddam Hussein puts his troops on their highest military alert since the Gulf War. A CIA official states that there was nothing obvious to warrant this move: “He was clearly expecting a massive attack and it leads you to wonder why.”Hussein apparently made a number of other moves at the time suggesting foreknowledge and the article strongly suggests Iraqi complicity in the 9/11 attacks. [Telegraph 9/23/01 (B)] Iraq will later be sued by 9/11 victims' relatives on the grounds that they had 9/11 foreknowledge but didn't warn the US (see September 4, 2002). Given Rumsfeld's early efforts to blame Iraq (see September 11, 2001 (V)) could such stories be early propaganda to justify a US attack on Iraq? Perhaps Iraq knew what might happen on 9/11 and worried they would be targeted in response?

Late August 2001 (B)
In an interview with the London-based newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, bin Laden boasts that he is planning a “very, very big” and “unprecedented” strike against the US. The interview is not publicly released until after 9/11, however, so its unclear if US intelligence was aware of this before 9/11. [Independent 9/17/01; ABC News 9/12/01]

Late August 2001 (D)
French intelligence gives a general terrorist warning to the US; apparently its contents echo an Israeli warning from earlier in the month (see August 8-15, 2001). [Fox News 5/17/02]

August 29, 2001
Three men from either Pakistan or Afghanistan living in the Cayman Islands are briefly arrested in June 2001 for discussing hijacking attacks in New York City (see June 4, 2001). On this day, a Cayman Islands radio station receives an unsigned letter claiming these same three men are agents of bin Laden. The anonymous author warns that they “are organizing a major terrorist act against the US via an airline or airlines.” The letter is forwarded to a Cayman government official but no action is taken until after 9/11 and it isn't known when the US is informed. Many criminals and/or businesses use the Cayman Islands as a safe, no tax, no questions asked haven to keep their money. The author of the letter meets with the FBI shortly after 9/11, and claims his information was a “premonition of sorts.” The three men are later arrested. Its unclear what has happened to them since their arrest. [Miami Herald, 9/20/01, Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01, MSNBC, 9/23/01] FTW, see for more on this topic.

August 30-September 4, 2001
According to Egyptian President Hasni Mubarak, Egyptian intelligence warns American officials that bin Laden's network is in the advanced stages of executing a significant operation against an American target, probably within the US. [AP, 12/7/01, New York Times, 6/4/02] He says he learned this information from an agent working inside al-Qaeda. US officials deny receiving any such warning from Egypt. [ABC News 6/4/02]

Early September 2001 (C)
According to British inside sources, “shortly before September 11,” bin Laden contacts an associate thought to be in Pakistan. The conversation refers to an incident that will take place in the US on, or around 9/11, and discusses possible repercussions. In another conversation, bin Laden contacts an associate thought to be in Afghanistan. They discuss the scale and effect of a forthcoming operation; bin Laden praises his colleague for his part in the planning. Neither conversation specifically mentions the WTC or Pentagon, but investigators have no doubt the 9/11 attacks were being discussed. The British government has obliquely made reference to these intercepts: “There is evidence of a very specific nature relating to the guilt of bin Laden and his associates that is too sensitive to release.” These intercepts haven't been made public in Blair's presentation of al-Qaeda's guilt (see October 4, 2001 (B)) because “releasing full details could compromise the source or method of the intercepts.” [Sunday Times 10/7/01]

Early September 2001 (B)
The NSA intercepts “multiple phone calls from Abu Zubaida, bin Laden's chief of operations, to the United States.” The timing and information contained in these intercepted phone calls has not been disclosed. [ABC News, 2/18/02] Shouldn't the US government have been able to determine who was being called, and find those people?

September 4, 2001 (E)
Hours before the only significant Bush administration Cabinet-level meeting on terrorism before 9/11 (see September 4, 2001 (C)), counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke writes a critical memo to National Security Advisor Rice. He criticizes the Defense Department for reluctance to use force against al-Qaeda and the CIA for impeding the deployment of unmanned Predator drones to hunt for bin Laden. According to the Washington Post, the memo urges “officials to imagine a day when hundreds of Americans lay dead from a terrorist attack and ask themselves what more they could have done.” [Washington Post 3/24/04; Washington Post 3/25/04 (B); 9/11 Commission Report 3/24/04 (D)]

September 4, 2001
“On or around” this day, the Mossad give their “latest”warning to the US of a major, imminent terrorist attack, according to sources close to Mossad. One former Mossad agent says, “My understanding is that the warning was not specific. No target was identified. But it should have resulted in an increased state of security.” US intelligence claims this never happened. [Sunday Mail 9/16/01]

September 7, 2001
Father Jean-Marie Benjamin is told at a wedding in Todi, Italy of a plot to attack the US and Britain using hijacked airplanes as weapons. He isn't told time or place specifics. He immediately passes what he knows to a judge and several politicians. He states: “Although I am friendly with many Muslims, I wondered why they were telling me, specifically. I felt it my duty to inform the Italian government.” Benjamin has been called “one of the West's most knowledgeable experts on the Muslim world.” Two days after 9/11, he meets with the Italian Foreign Minister on this topic. He says he learned the attack on Britain failed at the last minute. [Zenit, 9/16/01] He has not revealed who told him this information, but could it have been a member of the al-Qaeda cell in Milan (see August 12, 2000 and January 24, 2001), which appears to have helped with the 9/11 attacks?

Before September 11, 2001 (C)
Though the NSA specializes in intercepting communications, the CIA and FBI intercept as well. After 9/11, CIA and FBI officials discover messages with phrases like, “There is a big thing coming,” “They're going to pay the price” and “We're ready to go.” Supposedly, most or all of these intercepted messages were not analyzed until after 9/11. [Newsweek, 9/24/01] Does this mean that some of the hijackers or their assistants were under FBI or CIA surveillance before 9/11?

May 21-22, 2002
Walid Arkeh is a prisoner in Florida who claims to have told the FBI in August 2001 that al-Qaeda was likely to attack the WTC and other targets soon. At the time, his information was dismissed (see August 21, 2001). After 9/11, his warning is still not taken seriously by the local FBI, but on May 21 he is interviewed by a different group of FBI agents in New York City. They begin by asking him what the three al-Qaeda prisoners he befriended told him of the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998). When Arkeh mentions he has information about 9/11 that he told the FBI before 9/11, the agents are stunned. One says to him: “Let me tell you something. If you know what happened in New York, we are all in deep shit. We are in deep trouble.” He tells them that these prisoners hinted that the WTC would be attacked, and targets in Washington were mentioned as well. However, they did not tell him a date or that airplanes would be used. The New York FBI later informs him that they found his information credible. [Orlando Sentinel 10/30/02] Arkeh is later deported to Jordan despite a Responsible Cooperators Program promising visas to those who provided important terrorist information. It is unclear if even one person has been given rewards through this program. [Orlando Sentinel 11/10/02; Orlando Sentinel 1/11/03; Orlando Sentinel 3/12/03]

September 4, 2002
Over 1,400 relatives of 9/11 attack victims sue Iraq for more than $1 trillion, claiming there is evidence Iraq conspired with al-Qaeda on the 9/11 attacks. [CBS News 9/5/02] One of the key pieces of evidence cited is an article in an small town Iraqi newspaper written by Naeem Abd Muhalhal on July 21, 2001. He describes bin Laden thinking “seriously, with the seriousness of the Bedouin of the desert, about the way he will try to bomb the Pentagon after he destroys the White House.” He adds that bin Laden is “insisting very convincingly that he will strike America on the arm that is already hurting,” which has been interpreted as a possible reference to the 1993 bombing of the WTC. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein apparently praised this writer on September 1, 2001. The lawsuit is based largely on the idea that “Iraqi officials were aware of plans to attack American landmarks,” yet didn't warn their archenemy, the US. [AP, 9/4/02 (B)] Former CIA agent and terrorist consultant Robert Baer (see August 2001 (G)) is hired by the prosecuting legal team to find evidence of a meeting between Atta and Iraqi agents (see April 8, 2001 and September 19, 2001-October 20, 2002), but despite the help of the CIA, is unable find any evidence of such a meeting. [CBS 12/8/02]

End