August 6, 2001
President Bush receives a classified intelligence briefing at his Crawford, Texas ranch indicating that bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. The memo read to him is titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” The entire memo focuses on the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the US.[Newsweek, 5/27/02, New York Times, 5/15/02] A page and a half of the contents are released after National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice testifies to the 9/11 Commission [Washington Post, 4/10/04]. The 9/11 Congressional inquiry call it “a closely held intelligence report for senior government officials” presented in early August 2001. Rice testifies that the memo is mostly historic regarding bin Laden's previous activities and she says it contains no specific information that would have prevented an attack. The memo, as released, includes at least the following information:
Bin Laden has wanted to conduct attacks inside the US since 1997.
“Members of al-Qaeda, including some US citizens, [have] resided in or travelled to the US for years and the group apparently maintain a support structure” in the US.
A discussion of the arrest of Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999) and the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998).
Uncorroborated information obtained in 1998 that bin Laden wants to hijack airplanes to gain the release of US-held extremists such as Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see July 1990).
Information acquired in May 2001 indicating al-Qaeda is planning to infiltrate the US from Canada and attack the US using high explosives (see May 2001 (B)).
“FBI judgments about patterns of activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks.”
The number of on-going bin Laden-related investigations. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
Incredibly, the New York Times later reports that Bush “[breaks] off from work early and [spends] most of the day fishing” (see also August 4-30, 2001). [New York Times 5/25/02] The existence of this memo is kept secret, until it is leaked in May 2002, causing a storm of controversy (see May 15, 2002). National Security Advisor Rice gives an inaccurate description of the memo, claiming it is only one and a half pages long (other accounts state it is 11 and a half pages instead of the usual two or three). [Newsweek 5/27/02; New York Times 5/15/02; Die Zeit 10/1/02] She falsely claims, “It was an analytic report that talked about [bin Laden]'s methods of operation, talked about what he had done historically, in 1997, in 1998…. I want to reiterate, it was not a warning. There was no specific time, place, or method mentioned.” [White House 5/16/02]
August 8-15, 2001
At some point between these dates, Israel warns the US that an al-Qaeda attack is imminent. [Fox News, 5/17/02] Two high ranking agents from the Mossad come to Washington and warn the FBI and CIA that from 50 to 200 terrorists have slipped into the US and are planning “a major assault on the United States.” They say indications point to a “large scale target”, and that Americans would be “very vulnerable.” They add there could be Iraqi connections to the al-Qaeda attack. [Telegraph 9/16/01; Los Angeles Times 9/20/01; Ottawa Citizen 9/17/01] The Los Angeles Times later retracts the story after a CIA spokesman says, “There was no such warning. Allegations that there was are complete and utter nonsense.” [Los Angeles Times 9/21/01 (B)] In light of later revelations of a Mossad spy ring trailing numerous Muslim terrorists in the US, it is easy to see that Mossad would have known this info. Could this be later disinformation by the Mossad to spin the spy ring story and blame Iraq for 9/11, or it is another smoking gun showing extensive US foreknowledge?
August 13-15, 2001
Zacarias Moussaoui trains at the Pan Am International Flight School in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where he pays $8,300 ($1500 by credit card and the remainder in cash) to use a Boeing 474 Model 400 aircraft simulator. After just one day of training most of the staff is suspicious that he's a terrorist. They discuss “how much fuel [is] on board a 747-400 and how much damage that could cause if it hit anything.” They call the FBI with their concerns later that day. [New York Times, 2/8/02, Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] They are suspicious because:
In contrast to all the other students at this high-level flight school, he has no aviation background, little previous training and no pilot's license. [ Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]
He wants to fly a 747 not because he plans to be a pilot, but as an “ego boosting thing.” [New York Times, 10/18/02] Yet within hours of his arrival, it is clear he “was not some affluent joy-rider.” [New York Times, 2/8/02]
He is “extremely” interested in the operation of the plane's doors and control panel. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] He also is very keen on learning the protocol for communicating with the flight tower despite having no plans to actually become a pilot. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
He is evasive and belligerent when asked about his background. When an instructor, who notes from his records that Moussaoui is from France, attempts to greet him in French, Moussaoui appears not to understand, saying that he had spent very little time in France and that he is from the Middle East. The instructor considers it odd that Moussaoui did not specify the Middle Eastern country. [Minneapolis St. Paul Star Tribune, 12/21/01; Washington Post, 1/2/02]
He tells a flight instructor he is not a Muslim, but the instructor senses he is lying, badly, about it. [New Yorker, 9/30/02]
He says he would “love” to fly a simulated flight from London to New York, raising fears he has plans to hijack such a flight. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] His original e-mail to the flight school similarly stated he wanted to be good enough to fly from London to New York. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
He pays for thousands of dollars in expenses from a large wad of cash. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
He seemed to be trying to pack a large amount of training in a short period of time for no apparent reason. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
He mostly practices flying in the air, not taking off or landing (although note that reports claiming he didn't want to take off or land at all appear to be an exaggeration). [New York Times, 2/8/02, Slate, 5/21/02, Minneapolis St. Paul Star Tribune, 12/21/01, New York Times, 5/22/02]
Failing to get much initial interest from the FBI, the flight instructor tells the FBI agents, “Do you realize how serious this is? This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with fuel could be used as a weapon!” [New York Times 2/8/02]
August 15, 2001
Cofer Black, head of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, says in a speech to the Department of Defense's annual Convention of Counterterrorism, “We are going to be struck soon, many Americans are going to die, and it could be in the US.” Black later complains that top leaders are unwilling to act at this time unless they are given “such things as the attack is coming within the next few days and here is what they are going to hit.” [Congressional Inquiry 9/26/02 (B)]
August 21, 2001
Walid Arkeh, a Jordanian serving time in a Florida prison, is interviewed by FBI agents after warning the government of an impending terrorist attack. He had been in a British jail from September 2000 to July 2001, and while there had befriended three inmates, Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Eidarous. US prosecutors charge that “the three men ran a London storefront that served as a cover for al-Qaeda operations and acted as a conduit for communications between bin Laden and his network.” [Orlando Sentinel, 10/30/02] Al-Fawwaz was bin Laden's press agent in London, and bin Laden had called him over 200 times before al-Fawwaz was arrested in 1998. [Financial Times, 11/29/01 (B), Sunday Times, 3/24/02] The other two had worked in the same office as al-Fawwaz. All three have been indicted as co-conspirators with bin Laden in the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998). Arkeh tells the FBI that he had learned from these three that “something big was going to happen in New York City,” and that they had called the 1993 attack on the WTC “unfinished business.” Tampa FBI agents determine that he had associated with these al-Qaeda agents, but nonetheless they don't believe him. According to Arkeh, one agent responds to his “something big”warning by saying: “Is that all you have? That's old news.” The agents fail to learn more from him. On September 9, concerned that time is running out, a fellow prisoner tried to arrange a meeting, but nothing happens before 9/11. The Tampa FBI agents have a second interview with him hours after the 9/11 attacks, but even long after 9/11 they claim he cannot be believed. On January 6, 2002, the Tampa FBI issued a statement: “The information [was] vetted to FBI New York, the Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Tampa Division and the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida. All agreed the information provided by this individual was vague and unsubstantiated… Mr. Arkeh did not provide information that had any bearing on the FBI preventing September 11. ” [Orlando Sentinel, 1/6/02, Orlando Sentinel, 10/30/02] However, a different group of FBI agents interviews him later and finds his information is credible (see May 21-22, 2002). See for more on this topic.
August 23, 2001
According to German newspapers, the Mossad gives the CIA a list of terrorists living in the US and say that they appear to be planning to carry out an attack in the near future. It is unknown if these are the 19 9/11 hijackers or if the number is a coincidence. However, four names on the list are known and are names of the 9/11 hijackers: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. [Die Zeit 10/1/02; Der Spiegel 10/1/02; BBC 10/2/02; Ha'aretz 10/3/02] The Mossad appears to have learned about this through its “art student” spy ring (see for instance, March 5, 2002). Yet apparently this warning and list are not treated as particularly urgent by the CIA and also not passed on to the FBI. It's not clear if this warning influenced the adding of Alhazmi and Almihdhar to a terrorism watch list on this same day, and if so, why only those two. [Der Spiegel 10/1/02] Israel has denied that there were any Mossad agents in the US. [Ha'aretz, 10/3/02] The US has denied knowing about Atta before 9/11, despite other media reports to the contrary (see January-May 2000).
August 27, 2001
Spanish police tape a series of cryptic, coded phone calls from a caller in Britain using the codename “Shakur” to Barakat Yarkas (also known as Abu Dahdah), the leader of a Spanish al-Qaeda cell presumably visited by Atta (see July 8-19, 2001). A Spanish judge claims that a call by Shakur on this day shows foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. Shakur says that he is “giving classes” and that “in our classes, we have entered the field of aviation, and we have even cut the bird's throat.” Another possible translation is: “We are even going to cut the eagle's throat,”which would be a clearer metaphor for the US. [Observer, 11/25/01, Guardian, 2/14/02] In a Spanish indictment, the unknown Shakur is described as “a presumed member of the Sept. 11 suicide commandos.” [International Herald Tribune 11/21/01] The Spanish terrorist cell led by Yarkas was allegedly a hub of financing, recruitment and support services for al-Qaeda in Europe. Yarkas's phone number is later also found in the address book of Said Bahaji (see November 1, 1998-February 2001), and he had ties with Mohammed Haydar Zammar (see March 1997) and Mamoun Darkazanli (see Spring 2000) - all three are associates of Atta in Hamburg. [Los Angeles Times, 11/23/01] Yarkas also “reportedly met with bin Laden twice and was in close contact with” top deputy Muhammad Atef. [Washington Post, 11/19/01] On November 11, 2001, Yarkas and 10 other Spaniards are arrested and charged with al-Qaeda terrorist activity. [International Herald Tribune 11/21/01]
End Part XI
President Bush receives a classified intelligence briefing at his Crawford, Texas ranch indicating that bin Laden might be planning to hijack commercial airliners. The memo read to him is titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US.” The entire memo focuses on the possibility of terrorist attacks inside the US.[Newsweek, 5/27/02, New York Times, 5/15/02] A page and a half of the contents are released after National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice testifies to the 9/11 Commission [Washington Post, 4/10/04]. The 9/11 Congressional inquiry call it “a closely held intelligence report for senior government officials” presented in early August 2001. Rice testifies that the memo is mostly historic regarding bin Laden's previous activities and she says it contains no specific information that would have prevented an attack. The memo, as released, includes at least the following information:
Bin Laden has wanted to conduct attacks inside the US since 1997.
“Members of al-Qaeda, including some US citizens, [have] resided in or travelled to the US for years and the group apparently maintain
A discussion of the arrest of Ahmed Ressam (see December 14, 1999) and the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998).
Uncorroborated information obtained in 1998 that bin Laden wants to hijack airplanes to gain the release of US-held extremists such as Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman (see July 1990).
Information acquired in May 2001 indicating al-Qaeda is planning to infiltrate the US from Canada and attack the US using high explosives (see May 2001 (B)).
“FBI judgments about patterns of activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks.”
The number of on-going bin Laden-related investigations. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 9/18/02, Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
Incredibly, the New York Times later reports that Bush “[breaks] off from work early and [spends] most of the day fishing” (see also August 4-30, 2001). [New York Times 5/25/02] The existence of this memo is kept secret, until it is leaked in May 2002, causing a storm of controversy (see May 15, 2002). National Security Advisor Rice gives an inaccurate description of the memo, claiming it is only one and a half pages long (other accounts state it is 11 and a half pages instead of the usual two or three). [Newsweek 5/27/02; New York Times 5/15/02; Die Zeit 10/1/02] She falsely claims, “It was an analytic report that talked about [bin Laden]'s methods of operation, talked about what he had done historically, in 1997, in 1998…. I want to reiterate, it was not a warning. There was no specific time, place, or method mentioned.” [White House 5/16/02]
August 8-15, 2001
At some point between these dates, Israel warns the US that an al-Qaeda attack is imminent. [Fox News, 5/17/02] Two high ranking agents from the Mossad come to Washington and warn the FBI and CIA that from 50 to 200 terrorists have slipped into the US and are planning “a major assault on the United States.” They say indications point to a “large scale target”, and that Americans would be “very vulnerable.” They add there could be Iraqi connections to the al-Qaeda attack. [Telegraph 9/16/01; Los Angeles Times 9/20/01; Ottawa Citizen 9/17/01] The Los Angeles Times later retracts the story after a CIA spokesman says, “There was no such warning. Allegations that there was are complete and utter nonsense.” [Los Angeles Times 9/21/01 (B)] In light of later revelations of a Mossad spy ring trailing numerous Muslim terrorists in the US, it is easy to see that Mossad would have known this info. Could this be later disinformation by the Mossad to spin the spy ring story and blame Iraq for 9/11, or it is another smoking gun showing extensive US foreknowledge?
August 13-15, 2001
Zacarias Moussaoui trains at the Pan Am International Flight School in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where he pays $8,300 ($1500 by credit card and the remainder in cash) to use a Boeing 474 Model 400 aircraft simulator. After just one day of training most of the staff is suspicious that he's a terrorist. They discuss “how much fuel [is] on board a 747-400 and how much damage that could cause if it hit
In contrast to all the other students at this high-level flight school, he has no aviation background, little previous training and no pilot's license. [ Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02]
He wants to fly a 747 not because he plans to be a pilot, but as an “ego boosting thing.” [New York Times, 10/18/02] Yet within hours of his arrival, it is clear he “was not some affluent joy-rider.” [New York Times, 2/8/02]
He is “extremely” interested in the operation of the plane's doors and control panel. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] He also is very keen on learning the protocol for communicating with the flight tower despite having no plans to actually become a pilot. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
He is evasive and belligerent when asked about his background. When an instructor, who notes from his records that Moussaoui is from France, attempts to greet him in French, Moussaoui appears not to understand, saying that he had spent very little time in France and that he is from the Middle East. The instructor considers it odd that Moussaoui did not specify the Middle Eastern country. [Minneapolis St. Paul Star Tribune, 12/21/01; Washington Post, 1/2/02]
He tells a flight instructor he is not a Muslim, but the instructor senses he is lying, badly, about it. [New Yorker, 9/30/02]
He says he would “love” to fly a simulated flight from London to New York, raising fears he has plans to hijack such a flight. [Senate Intelligence Committee, 10/17/02] His original e-mail to the flight school similarly stated he wanted to be good enough to fly from London to New York. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
He pays for thousands of dollars in expenses from a large wad of cash. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
He seemed to be trying to pack a large amount of training in a short period of time for no apparent reason. [New York Times, 2/8/02]
He mostly practices flying in the air, not taking off or landing (although note that reports claiming he didn't want to take off or land at all appear to be an exaggeration). [New York Times, 2/8/02, Slate, 5/21/02, Minneapolis St. Paul Star Tribune, 12/21/01, New York Times, 5/22/02]
Failing to get much initial interest from the FBI, the flight instructor tells the FBI agents, “Do you realize how serious this is? This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with fuel could be used as a weapon!” [New York Times 2/8/02]
August 15, 2001
Cofer Black, head of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, says in a speech to the Department of Defense's annual Convention of Counterterrorism, “We are going to be struck soon, many Americans are going to die, and it could be in the US.” Black later complains that top leaders are unwilling to act at this time unless they are given “such things as the attack is coming within the next few days and here is what they are going to hit.” [Congressional Inquiry 9/26/02 (B)]
August 21, 2001
Walid Arkeh, a Jordanian serving time in a Florida prison, is interviewed by FBI agents after warning the government of an impending terrorist attack. He had been in a British jail from September 2000 to July 2001, and while there had befriended three inmates, Khalid al-Fawwaz, Adel Abdel Bary and Ibrahim Eidarous. US prosecutors charge that “the three men ran a London storefront that served as a cover for al-Qaeda operations and acted as a conduit for communications between bin Laden and his network.” [Orlando Sentinel, 10/30/02] Al-Fawwaz was bin Laden's press agent in London, and bin Laden had called him over 200 times before al-Fawwaz was arrested in 1998. [Financial Times, 11/29/01 (B), Sunday Times, 3/24/02] The other two had worked in the same office as al-Fawwaz. All three have been indicted as co-conspirators with bin Laden in the 1998 US embassy bombings (see August 7, 1998). Arkeh tells the FBI that he had learned from these three that “something big was going to happen in New York City,” and that they had called the 1993 attack on the WTC “unfinished business.” Tampa FBI agents determine that he had associated with these al-Qaeda agents, but nonetheless they don't believe him. According to Arkeh, one agent responds to his “something big”warning by saying: “Is that all you have? That's old news.” The agents fail to learn more from him. On September 9, concerned that time is running out, a fellow prisoner tried to arrange a meeting, but nothing happens before 9/11. The Tampa FBI agents have a second interview with him hours after the 9/11 attacks, but even long after 9/11 they claim he cannot be believed. On January 6, 2002, the Tampa FBI issued a statement: “The information [was] vetted to FBI New York, the Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Tampa Division and the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida. All agreed the information provided by this individual was vague and unsubstantiated… Mr. Arkeh did not provide information that had any bearing on the FBI preventing September 11. ” [Orlando Sentinel, 1/6/02, Orlando Sentinel, 10/30/02] However, a different group of FBI agents interviews him later and finds his information is credible (see May 21-22, 2002). See for more on this topic.
August 23, 2001
According to German newspapers, the Mossad gives the CIA a list of terrorists living in the US and say that they appear to be planning to carry out an attack in the near future. It is unknown if these are the 19 9/11 hijackers or if the number is a coincidence. However, four names on the list are known and are names of the 9/11 hijackers: Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, and Mohamed Atta. [Die Zeit 10/1/02; Der Spiegel 10/1/02; BBC 10/2/02; Ha'aretz 10/3/02] The Mossad appears to have learned about this through its “art student” spy ring (see for instance, March 5, 2002). Yet apparently this warning and list are not treated as particularly urgent by the CIA and also not passed on to the FBI. It's not clear if this warning influenced the adding of Alhazmi and Almihdhar to a terrorism watch list on this same day, and if so, why only those two. [Der Spiegel 10/1/02] Israel has denied that there were any Mossad agents in the US. [Ha'aretz, 10/3/02] The US has denied knowing about Atta before 9/11, despite other media reports to the contrary (see January-May 2000).
August 27, 2001
Spanish police tape a series of cryptic, coded phone calls from a caller in Britain using the codename “Shakur” to Barakat Yarkas (also known as Abu Dahdah), the leader of a Spanish al-Qaeda cell presumably visited by Atta (see July 8-19, 2001). A Spanish judge claims that a call by Shakur on this day shows foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. Shakur says that he is “giving classes” and that “in our classes, we have entered the field of aviation, and we have even cut the bird's throat.” Another possible translation is: “We are even going to cut the eagle's throat,”which would be a clearer metaphor for the US. [Observer, 11/25/01, Guardian, 2/14/02] In a Spanish indictment, the unknown Shakur is described as “a presumed member of the Sept. 11 suicide commandos.” [International Herald Tribune 11/21/01] The Spanish terrorist cell led by Yarkas was allegedly a hub of financing, recruitment and support services for al-Qaeda in Europe. Yarkas's phone number is later also found in the address book of Said Bahaji (see November 1, 1998-February 2001), and he had ties with Mohammed Haydar Zammar (see March 1997) and Mamoun Darkazanli (see Spring 2000) - all three are associates of Atta in Hamburg. [Los Angeles Times, 11/23/01] Yarkas also “reportedly met with bin Laden twice and was in close contact with” top deputy Muhammad Atef. [Washington Post, 11/19/01] On November 11, 2001, Yarkas and 10 other Spaniards are arrested and charged with al-Qaeda terrorist activity. [International Herald Tribune 11/21/01]
End Part XI